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ARTICLES
BALANCING RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES AND
ANTIDISCRIMINATION INTERESTS IN THE PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT: THE IMPACT OF
MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP AND AMERICAN LEGION
Brenda Bauges *
INTRODUCTION
At the heart of national debate in recent years is the balance
between religious liberty and antidiscrimination interests.1 The
Supreme Court energized the debate in its latest Free Speech and
Establishment Clause decisions in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc.,2 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commis-
sion,3 and American Legion v. American Humanist Association.4
These decisions pushed the pendulum towards greater protection
of religious liberties and opened the door to new context-specific
tests for how the Establishment Clause will interact with the
broader range of interests protected by the Free Exercise Clause.
This is especially significant in the public employment context,
where government employers must balance requests for religious
freedom accommodations with Establishment Clause concerns.
* Visiting Professor at the University of Idaho, College of Law. Professor Bauges was
previously, from 2018-2020, an Assistant Professor at Concordia University School of Law
and Director of Externships, Mentorship, and Pro Bono Programs. Prior to joining Concor-
dia Law, Professor Bauges practiced in employment law, representing both government en-
tities and private organizations. She is grateful for the help of her research assistant, Gwen
King, and her colleagues for their encouragement and advice. She would especially like to
thank Aaron and Alexander Bauges for their unwavering support and patience.
1. See infra notes 7, 21 and accompanying text.
2. 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
3. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
4. 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
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This Article first explores the historical underpinnings that tra-
ditionally marked the line between antidiscrimination and reli-
gious interests before the Court's most recent Free Exercise deci-
sion. In so doing, this Article argues that where the Court, and
society, has landed on this question at any one point in time de-
pends on the paradigm through which it is looking at the issue.
The paradigms on both sides of the dichotomy have defining char-
acteristics, both of which are demonstrated in the Court's decisions
in Hobby Lobby and Masterpiece. These cases diverge from the nor-
mative approach and embrace the "protection paradigm," which fa-
vors greater protection of religious freedom.
Next, this Article details the importance of the protection para-
digm operating in the employment context generally, and the pub-
lic employment context in particular. As to the latter, this Article
outlines the concerns of a government employer as they relate to
balancing claims for religious liberties with the employer's obliga-
tions pursuant to the Establishment Clause. It details the unique
context of a governmental entity as both sovereign and employer
and argues for the importance of a situation-specific standard in
these situations. To put this context in perspective, this Article re-
views the Establishment Clause jurisprudence that led to the Su-
preme Court's most recent decision in American Legion. After ex-
amining American Legion itself, this Article argues that the Court
has opened the door to, and indeed indicated its preference for, the
development of more context-specific tests. This is especially pref-
erable in the public employment context and in light of the cur-
rently prevailing protection paradigm.
Finally, this Article concludes by analyzing different potential
methods for trying to balance religious liberty claims with antidis-
crimination concerns, and thus Establishment Clause concerns, in
public employment. This Article argues for a combination of rele-
vant tests that balances the magnitude and likelihood of third-
party harm, substantiality of burden to religious liberty, and avail-
ability or prevalence of secular accommodations. This test provides
room for factual inquiry and context-specific value judgments,
while still allowing a workable framework, the results of which are
sufficiently predictable that employers and employees are not left




I. THE CONSTANT FLUX OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS:
A DICHOTOMY OF PARADIGMS
Religious liberty and freedom are amorphous concepts, both in
society at large and in the law.5 Over the past 230 years, the de-
marcation between religious exercise and overreach can be likened
to a pendulum constantly swinging.6 Recently, this debate has
been labeled in terms of tension between protection for religious
freedoms and protection against discrimination.7 As discussed
more fully infra, this Article addresses the dichotomy of paradigms
that rules the constant swinging of this pendulum. This Article ar-
gues that the current paradigm in the Free Exercise context as il-
lustrated by the recent Supreme Court case in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission8 is one sym-
pathetic to a broad reading of religious liberties that we have not
seen in approximately twenty years. To set the scene for a compre-
hensive look at the legal landscape as it exists post-Masterpiece, a
brief history of the give and take between greater religious free-
doms and lesser-or, put another way, protection of religious free-
dom versus antidiscrimination interests-is helpful.9
A. The Pendulum Swings
Prior to the 1960s, the prevailing law regarding religious free-
doms and liberties did not include an affirmative accommodation
5. See STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 9
(2014) (arguing that "understandings of religious freedom have reflected broader, competing
interpretations of the American Republic" and that America has in the past "embrac[ed] a
commitment to religious freedom while leaving open to contestation the particular concep-
tion of that commitment").
6. See infra section I.A.
7. See, e.g., NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE 1 (2017); An-
gela C. Carmella, Catholic Institutions in Court: The Religion Clauses and Political-Legal
Compromise, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2017) (stating the proper scope of religious freedom is
"hotly contested" and that "[t]here are those who argue that a special status for religion
violates basic notions of equality or causes harm"). In Religious Freedom, Professor Nelson
Tebbe argues that "[c]omplex factors are contributing to the perception of conflict between
religious freedom and equity law today," including the movement for comprehensive civil
rights protections for LGBT persons. TEBBE, supra, at 1. Interestingly, however, Professor
Tebbe also warns not to "oversimplify the perceived face-off between religious freedom and
equality law." Id. at 4. This is because, he argues, "[m]any religious traditions place com-
mitments of nondiscrimination at or near the center of their faith. Conversely, civil rights
law safeguards believers alongside members of other protected groups." Id.
8. 138 S. Ct. 1719.
9. This initial history is focused on Free Exercise jurisprudence; a history of Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence can be found infra section IV.B.1.a.
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of religious conscience.10 That is, free exercise protected a person's
beliefs, but not conduct that violated generally applicable laws.11
Then, for approximately thirty years between 1960 and 1990, the
paradigm shifted, giving greater emphasis and deference to reli-
gious liberties.'2 If government action imposed a substantial bur-
den on the practice of religion, the government was required to
show that the burden served a compelling government interest.13
The Supreme Court used this standard to ensure that an employee
who was fired for refusing to work on the Sabbath was not denied
unemployment benefits1 4 and that families ascribing to the Amish
faith were not forced to comply with state education requirements
when their faith called them to educate their children uniquely to
Amish values and beliefs.16
However, in 1990 the balance shifted back and away from
greater protection for religious liberty with the Supreme Court de-
cision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith.16 In that case, the Court rejected the balancing
10. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (declining to allow
an accommodation from a generally applicable criminal statute to accommodate a religious
objection); see also SMITH, supra note 5, at 73 (laying out the standard accepted view of Free
Exercise jurisprudence shifts in paradigm and focus, but ultimately concluding that the "re-
ality" of these shifts is not as clear cut). It is important to note that the brief history con-
tained in this section is simplified to reflect broad themes rather than legal nuance. For a
more detailed historical examination of Free Exercise jurisprudence, see Erwin Chemerin-
sky & Michele Goodwin, Religion Is Not a Basis for Harming Others: Review Essay of Paul
A. Offit's Bad Faith: When Religious Belief Undermines Modern Medicine, 104 GEO. L.J.
1111, 1116-22 (2016).
11. SMITH, supra note 5, at 73 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145).
12. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 410 (1963); see also SMITH, supra note 5, at 73. But see Gary J. Simson, Permissible
Accommodation or Impermissible Endorsement? A Proposed Approach to Religious Exemp-
tions and the Establishment Clause, 106 KY. L.J. 535, 565 & n.96, 570 n.131 (2018) (stating
that the success rate for Free Exercise claims from 1960 to 1990 was well below fifty percent,
but acknowledging that those statistics may be misleading as the Court is highly selective
in exercising its discretionary review authority and the sample size is small and not neces-
sarily representative of the cases "in the pipeline"); see also Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra
note 10, at 1117-20 (stating that although the Court applied strict scrutiny in evaluating
laws infringing on the free exercise of religion post-Sherbert, the Court rarely struck down
such laws in the Sherbert era).
13. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 693 (2014); Yoder, 406 U.S. at
221-29; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
14. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410; see also Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 693.
15. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-36; see also Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 694.
16. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see also SMITH, supra note 5, at 73 (concluding that the Court
"went from not requiring 'free exercise exemptions' of conscience to requiring them, and
then retreated to something like its initial 'no required exemptions' position").
[Vol. 54:943946
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test if the government action at issue was "neutral" and a "gener-
ally applicable law."17 This shift heralded a new era that would last
for approximately twenty-five years.18 In this new era, the govern-
ment can burden free exercise, even without a compelling govern-
ment interest, so long as the action at issue is "neutral" towards
religion and generally applicable.19 During its early stages, Con-
gress pushed back by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act ("RFRA"), which sought to recover the pre-Smith balance be-
tween religious liberties and other antidiscrimination interests.20
Nevertheless, Smith marked a shift reflected in society where more
voices began labeling free and open religious practice as an "impo-
sition of faith" on others or a "manifestation of 'discrimination and
bigotry."' 2 1
17. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881, 884-85.
18. Compare id. at 885 (concluding that the government needs no compelling interest
to burden religious exercise, if the law at issue is generally applicable), with Hobby Lobby,
573 U.S. at 690-91, 694-95, and Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n,
138 S. Ct. 1719, 1734, 1740 (2018) (discussed infra sections I.B-II.B).
19. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513, 536
(1997) (reaffirming the Court's ruling in Smith and invalidating the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act as applied to the states pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment); see also
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 694.
20. Three years after the decision in Smith, Congress enacted RFRA finding that "laws
'neutral' toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to inter-
fere with religious exercise" and "the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement
that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward
religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2)-(4) (1994). RFRA prohibits the government from sub-
stantially burdening a person's free exercise of religion, even in the face of a rule of general
applicability, unless it can demonstrate (1) the burden is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. §
2000bb(b)(1)-(2). Although Congress initially intended RFRA to apply to both the federal
government and the states, the Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitutional as applied to
the states. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 695; Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. However, some states
have passed their own RFRAs. See State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT'L CONF.
ST. LEGISLATURES (May 4, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice
/state-rfra-statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/S36J-CHEE].
While RFRA and Title VII are additional statutory vehicles through which employees and
employers will continue to engage in attempting to balance the protection of free exercise of
religion and antidiscrimination concerns, they will not be addressed further. This Article is
ultimately concerned with the public employment context, wherein the interplay of the First
Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses have significant implications. This
Article recognizes that RFRA and Title VII are appropriate, and in many cases the preferred
(and in some courts and certain instances even deemed exclusive as to Title VII) avenues
for religious discrimination claims. Even so, these two statutory avenues are not available
in all contexts, especially RFRA. Additionally, constitutional analysis informs statutory in-
terpretation and vice-versa, which makes the constitutional paradigm shift discussed herein
telling in these statutory contexts as well. See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
21. Carmella, supra note 7, at 2 (stating that religious involvement in the recent "cul-
ture war battles" is considered an "imposition of faith" on others or a "manifestation of 'dis-
crimination and bigotry"') (citing U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE:
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B. The Pendulum's Recent Swing Towards Greater Religious
Freedom Protection
Enter the United States Supreme Court decision in Hobby
Lobby.22 In Hobby Lobby, the sincerely held Christian beliefs of the
owners of three closely held, for-profit corporations were at odds
with complying with the rules and guidelines of the Department of
Health and Human Services ("HHS"), promulgated pursuant to the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA"). 23 These busi-
ness owners had religious objections to abortion and, according to
their religious beliefs, certain methods of birth control essentially
constituted abortion.24 Based on that, the business owners believed
that providing health-insurance coverage for these methods of con-
traception was facilitating abortions.25 To do so, in the sentiments
of one group of the business owners, was to "sin against God [for]
which [the business owners] are held accountable."26
The HHS guidelines required the business owners, however, to
provide insurance coverage to their employees for all contraceptive
methods approved by the Food and Drug Administration.27 These
included the contraceptive methods to which the business owners
objected.28 Failure to provide coverage resulted in heavy financial
penalties.29
RECONCILING NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL LIBERTIES (2016), http://usccr.
gov/pubs/docs/Peaceful-Coexistence-09-07-16.PDF [https://perma.cc/9UFE-4YNE]); see also,
e.g., SMITH, supra note 5, at 150-52; TEBBE, supra note 7, at 1 ("Expansion of equality law
has contributed to a sense among some religious traditionalists that there has been an in-
version. They feel they now are the minorities who require protection from an overweening
liberal orthodoxy.").
22. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682.
23. Id. at 696-704 (the guidelines were actually established through the Health Re-
sources and Services Administration ("HRSA"), an agency of HHS); see also 26 U.S.C. §
5000A(f)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4).
24. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 691.
25. Id. at 691.
26. Id. at 701 (quoting Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 382 (3d Cir. 2013)).
27. Id. at 697. More specifically, the ACA mandates that employers provide insurance
coverage for "preventive care and screenings" for women. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4). HHS,
through HRSA's guidelines, interprets this to include all contraceptive methods approved
by the Food and Drug Administration. Women's Preventive Services Guidelines, HEALTH
RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.hrsa.gov/womens-guidelines/index.html#2 (last
modified Dec. 2019) [https://perma.cc/X3GA-LY8N].
28. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 691, 697-98.
29. Id. at 697; see also id. at 691 (discussing that for one of the business owners, the
penalty would have been approximately $1.3 million per day); id. at 720 (stating that the
penalties could amount to $475 million, $33 million, or $15 million per year depending on
[Vol. 54:943948
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The Court ultimately held that requiring the business owners to
provide this coverage substantially burdened their exercise of reli-
gion and was not the least restrictive means of achieving a compel-
ling government interest.30 This holding was not made pursuant to
First Amendment jurisprudence, but rather to the legal framework
of RFRA.31 Although this federal statute is not the focus of this Ar-
ticle, the logical paradigm that is reflected in this decision-and
began the shift in balance towards an era of greater protection of
religious freedom-is important to understand and apply the
Court's later First Amendment jurisprudence in Masterpiece.32 In-
deed, that Hobby Lobby marked a shift in the balance between the
protection of free exercise of religion and other antidiscrimination
interests was not lost on scholars.33
C. Introduction to the Paradigms
A dichotomy of paradigms is responsible for the cyclical nature
of which interest, religious freedom or other antidiscrimination,
finds favor when directly opposed to the other. These paradigms
have been called different things by different scholars.34 At the risk
the party at issue).
30. Id. at 726-30.
31. Id. at 690-91; supra note 20; infra note 134 and accompanying text.
32. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018);
supra note 20; infra note 134 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Lauren Sudeall Lucas, The Free Exercise of Religious Identity, 64 UCLA L.
REV. 54, 96-101 (2017) (discussing how the decision in Hobby Lobby "tread[ed] a different
ground" and that claimants had moved from "trying to ... carve out a protected space in the
individual or personal sphere for the exercise of religious identity" to "the protection of iden-
tity as exercised beyond that sphere and with regard to the rights of others"); Christopher
C. Lund, Religious Exemptions, Third-Party Harms, and the Establishment Clause, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1375, 1376-81 (2016) (discussing the appropriate standard for when
religious accommodations are improper in light of third-party harms in the wake of Hobby
Lobby).
34. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 5, at 86-87 (discussing a "secularist" and a "providen-
tialist" viewpoint); TEBBE, supra note 7, at 59-60 (discussing the "classic baseline argu-
ment," and how one's "baseline for comparison" affects the outcome to any particular ques-
tion), id. at 170-72 (discussing two "paradigms": one focusing on the disapproval of a
religious accommodation, i.e., its impact on a protected group of citizens, and one focusing
on the importance of religious freedom of the religiously accommodated); Frederick Mark
Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassel, Of Burdens and Baselines: Hobby Lobby's Puzzling Foot-
note 37, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 323, 332-33 (Micah Schwartzman
et al. eds., 2016) (discussing "negative-liberty" and "positive-liberty" baselines); Lucas, su-
pra note 33, at 88 (discussing two types of claims when trying to balance religious liberties
and other interests: the "protective" and the "projective"); Lund, supra note 33, at 1376-77
(discussing that each "side" to the issues in Hobby Lobby had a different "baseline" focusing
on either the ACA or the status quo prior to the ACA as the basis for comparison). Although
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of oversimplifying what has been shown previously as a complex
and longstanding tradeoff between greater and lesser protection of
religious freedoms, the analytical framework that elicits decisions
favoring religious interests over other interests will be referred to
in this Article as the "protection paradigm." On the other hand, the
framework that results in a conclusion that religious accommoda-
tion interests are subordinate to, or superseded by, other interests
will be referred to in this Article as the "subordination paradigm."
The precedent leading up to Hobby Lobby, discussed supra, il-
lustrates the shifting between, or circular nature of, these two par-
adigms.35 Some scholars posit that this is a good thing, that an es-
sential feature of religious freedom in America is that
interpretations of the balance between religious freedom and other
interests are allowed to differ, evolve, and move between favorit-
ism.36 Regardless, starting with Hobby Lobby, this country began
that shift, or circuit, once again towards favoring religious liberties
when other interests are at odds.
1. The Protection Paradigm
The protection paradigm is overtly present in the Court's major-
ity opinion in Hobby Lobby.37 A defining facet of this paradigm is
not passing judgment on the reasonableness, correctness, or im-
portance of a person's expressed religious beliefs.38 To this end, the
there are some parallels, not all of these different viewpoints, baselines, and frames of ref-
erence align with the particular aspects of the dichotomy of paradigms as I describe them
herein.
35. See also SMITH, supra note 5, at 73-74 (stating the "issue ... has been debated
throughout American history, with no decisive resolution in sight").
36. See, e.g., id. at 108. Professor Steven Smith states,
One family of interpretations favored secular governance. Government should
keep clear of religion in its activities, expressions, and purposes-and vice
versa. Another family of interpretations, while striving to be inclusively ecu-
menical and insisting on protection for the free exercise of religion, interpreted
the Republic in more providentialist terms. Both types of interpretations have
deep and venerable roots in the American political tradition. And the genius of
the American settlement was that instead of officially elevating one or the
other of those interpretations to the status of constitutional orthodoxy and con-
demning the other as constitutional heresy, the American approach left the
matter open for We the People to reflect on and debate and negotiate on an
ongoing basis.
Id. (footnote omitted).
37. 573 U.S. 682 (2014). The Court's opinion was authored by Justice Alito, and joined
by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas. Justice Kennedy also joined
in the opinion, but filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 687.
38. See id. at 723-24; Caroline Mala Corbin, Government Employee Religion, 49 ARIZ.
[Vol. 54:943950
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Court takes issue with the principal dissent's argument that
providing coverage would not directly "result in the destruction of
an embryo."39 In making this argument, the Court points out that
Justice Ginsburg's dissent is actually addressing the question of
whether the religious belief at issue is reasonable, which is some-
thing "that the federal courts have no business addressing."40 The
result of this facet of the protection paradigm is that those with a
sincerely held belief that their religious tenets are at odds with an
action or inaction required by a government mandate will not be
required to justify those tenets or their moral objection.41 What
they will have to prove, of course, is that their religious belief is
sincerely held.42
As the Court attempts to illustrate, if a person truly believes
that his or her actions-like in Hobby Lobby by providing insur-
ance coverage-facilitate the breaking of a religious tenet-as in
Hobby Lobby by financially supporting destruction of embryos that
are seen as lives-then his or her belief system assures them they
will suffer consequences.43 Those taking this position argue that
when they stand before their God on the day of judgment, they will
be held responsible for any embryo that was destroyed, or in their
view, life that was taken, by virtue of the monetary support ren-
dered. As the Court stated, such a belief "implicates a difficult and
important question of religion and moral philosophy, namely, the
circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to perform an
act that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or
facilitating the commission of an immoral act by another."44 Thus,
the protection paradigm results in providing respect and deference
not only to underlying religious beliefs regarding tenets of religion,
but also regarding what actions or inactions would be violative of
ST. L.J. 1193, 1220-21 & nn.135-36, 138-39 (2017) (first quoting Daniel O. Conkle, The
Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to Formal Neutrality and
an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 15 (2000); and then quoting Benjamin L. Berger, Law's
Religion: Rendering Culture, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 277, 309 (2007)) (arguing that govern-
ment cannot discern an objective religious truth and stating the position of other scholars
that "[c]ertain 'zones of conscience' are entitled to legal protection" particularly "to safeguard
'the right of an individual to make choices about his or her spiritual life"').
39. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 723.
40. Id. at 723-24.
41. See id. at 724-26.
42. Id. at 725.
43. Id. at 724-26.
44. Id. at 724.
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those beliefs as they relate to government requirements or prohi-
bitions.45
To put it simply, the protection paradigm requires decision mak-
ers to ask, if they believed as the religious claimant does, would
they want someone to protect them against being forced to take the
action at issue? Even on the question of whether for-profit busi-
nesses could be considered "persons" pursuant to RFRA, the Court
took pains to address the importance of looking at the issues
through the eyes of a sincerely held religious believer.46 To look at
the situation otherwise would be to "[a]rrogat[e] the authority to
provide a binding national answer to ... religious and philosophi-
cal question[s]" and to tell religious believers "that their beliefs are
flawed."47 Looking at the case through this paradigm, the Court
found that it is not for courts to say that "religious beliefs are mis-
taken or insubstantial."48 Indeed, as Justice Kennedy states in his
concurrence, "Among the reasons the United States is so open, so
tolerant, and so free is that no person may be restricted or de-
meaned by government in exercising his or her religion."49 In this
way, the protection paradigm highlights the burden on religious
observers, while diminishing the focus on the effect religious ob-
servance has on others.50
45. Id. at 724-25; see Stephanie H. Barclay, First Amendment "Harms," 95 IND. L.J.
331, 350 (2020) (critiquing the inverse of this paradigm, namely the "underinclusive" prem-
ise of "the third-party harm theory ... that there is a meaningful category of religious ex-
emptions which do not result in cognizable harm to third parties").
46. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 705-06, 726 (stating that not covering closely held for-
profit corporations under the definition of "person" would result in a "difficult choice: either
give up the right to seek judicial protection of . . . religious liberty or forgo the benefits,
available to . . . competitors, of operating as corporations"). Although this particular issue
is outside the scope of this Article's focus, the sensitivity to the choices afforded to religious
believers even in this context helps illustrate the protection paradigm tends towards deci-
sions in favor of protecting religious liberties.
47. Id. at 724.
48. Id. at 725. One can easily understand the import of this particular train of logic to
this paradigm. Any system of religious viewpoints, grounded in faith and belief rather than
empirical evidence in most cases, is severely subject to reasonableness and justification at-
tacks. In a system that values empirical data and well-reasoned logic, like the legal system,
religious viewpoints are at a disadvantage.
49. Id. at 739 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy does go on to state, "Yet nei-
ther may that same exercise unduly restrict other persons, such as employees, in protecting
their own interests, interests the law deems compelling" and points out the need to "recon-
cile those two priorities." Id.
50. See id. at 726-32 (majority opinion) (discussing how the burden put on the govern-
ment or third parties is not sufficient to outweigh the burden on religious exercise).
952 [Vol. 54:943
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Another facet of this paradigm is individual inquiry.51 In the face
of the seriousness of religious burdens, justification for intrusion
must be specific to the religious exercise of the particular person at
issue, not generalizations.5 2 That is, the harm caused by the reli-
gious exercise of the individual at issue must be considered in and
of itself without sweeping generalities about the harm it might
cause in other cases.5 3
2. The Subordination Paradigm
Conversely, the subordination paradigm is illustrated in the dis-
senting opinion in Hobby Lobby.54 The defining facet of this para-
digm is the focus on the impact on those who do not ascribe to the
particular religious belief at issue.55 Where the protection para-
digm asks the decision maker to observe the situation through the
eyes of the religious objector, the subordination paradigm asks the
decision maker to observe the situation through the eyes of those
who are affected by the religious objector's actions or inactions.56
This paradigm highlights the disadvantage to the nonreligious
third party, while shifting the focus away from the burden to the
religious exercise of the person seeking accommodation.57 The dis-
sent seems to argue that no alternative means for the government
51. Id. at 726-27.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 726-27, 732-33.
54. See id. at 739 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion was authored by
Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justice Sotomayor. Id. Justices Breyer and Kagan joined
with the exception of Part III.C.1. Id. Part III.C.1 contains the discussion regarding whether
for-profit corporations and/or their owners have standing to bring a claim pursuant to
RFRA. Id. at 750-57.
This paradigm is similar to that called "secular neutrality" or "secularism" by some, and
has been seen as essential to a nation of citizens with numerous and varied conceptions of
religion, ethics, and the world. See SMITH, supra note 5, at 83.
55. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 740 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (focusing on "the impact
that accommodation may have on third parties who do not share the corporation owners'
religious faith"); Lucas, supra note 33, at 56-57 (stating that courts are either "hesitant to
question the sincerity or validity of religious beliefs . .. [or] concentrate on the nature of the
resulting discrimination and its effect on others," and arguing that while "a sphere of per-
sonal freedom to define and pursue one's identity" is protected, "it should not be understood
to protect identity when projected externally and imposed on others").
56. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 744 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Lucas, supra note 33,
at 56-57.
57. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 758 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (highlighting language
of prior opinions indicating that not every action that has some effect on religious exercise
is inherently suspect); id. at 765 (stating that a least-restrictive means to achieve the gov-
ernment's objective is not sufficient if it is not "equally effective" as if the religious accom-
modation was not granted); TEBBE, supra note 7, at 16 (relegating harms faced by religious
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to achieve its objective is allowable unless the third party claiming
harm experiences no inconvenience at all, while the religious ob-
server must not expect to "adhere unreservedly to their religious
tenets."58
Another facet of the subordination paradigm is that it does not
give blind deference to claims of religious objection. Thus, the de-
cision maker can evaluate whether the action or inaction to which
there is an objection truly violates the religious tenets at issue, and
to what degree, to determine whether there is reasonable support
to the religious objector's claim.59 In Hobby Lobby, the dissent char-
acterizes this as whether religion is "substantially" burdened.60
The subordination paradigm is marked by skepticism of reli-
gious exemptions and questions giving special consideration to re-
ligious interests over other interests.61 For example, the dissent fo-
cuses on the idea that an employer checks his or her religious
rights at the door, so to speak, when he or she decides to go public
actors to a controversy as a "cost" and feelings of disrespect, but viewing harms faced by
nonreligious actors to the controversy as harm to "equal citizenship"); id. at 18-19, 22 (char-
acterizing harm to others in light of religious accommodations as "social subordination" but
labeling harm to the religious objector as a "burden[] but not [a] demot[ion]" because the
laws at issue tend to be neutral as opposed to targeted). Professor Tebbe, in the book cited
prior-Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age-appears to conclude that a private citizen
bearing the cost of the effects of another private citizen's religious exercise can be distin-
guished from a private citizen bearing the cost of the effects of another private citizen's
objection to religious exercise. Id. This illustrates the conclusion that the subordination par-
adigm allows adherents to draw, which is that there is a distinction between harms, though
private citizens on both sides are bearing a burden that affects, for them, the rights of equal
citizenship.
58. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 765-66 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 759-60 (reiterating that a court must not question religious beliefs or inter-
pretations of creeds, but then drawing on precedent to conclude that the level of substanti-
ality of whether the belief is truly burdened as a religious matter of fact is within the scope
of appropriate judicial authority). There are varying levels to this facet. The one on display
in Hobby Lobby was a direct questioning of whether the religious tenet was in fact burdened
or if the effect was "too attenuated" to truly impact religious tenets. Id. at 760. But other
iterations of this aspect attempt to distinguish between questioning the religious tenets and
application thereof at issue, and the actual tangible secular burden experienced. Simson,
supra note 12, at 573-74.
60. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 758-59 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (analyzing substantial
burden according to RFRA's standards); id. at 760 (discussing how the contraceptive cover-
age requirement is "too attenuated" to be a substantial burden on a person practicing his or
her belief that certain contraceptives are abortion, the engagement in which is violative of
that person's religious tenets).
61. See TEBBE, supra note 7, at 149-50. Here, and elsewhere, Professor Tebbe questions
why exempting religious employers should be viewed any different than exempting secular
employers who hold similar objections to an antidiscrimination law. Id. He argues that if a
court would not grant an exception for a nonreligious reason, principles of fairness dictate
that it should not do so for a religious reason. Id.
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with his or her business.6 2 Otherwise, the employee is forced to ei-
ther choose between staying with the employer and bearing the
costs of the employer's religious exercise-as in Hobby Lobby by
not receiving coverage for important health care options-or the
economic burden of finding new employment.6 3
Additionally, the paradigm tends to focus not on the individual
case, but on broad and generally applicable principles of harm.64
For example, the dissenting opinion begins by highlighting well-
known empirical data and arguments that women's control over
reproductive health is necessary for equal participation in the
country's economic and social life.65 It also points out how contra-
ceptives support women's health in general.66 As such, the discus-
sion did not touch upon the specific contraceptive methods at issue
in Hobby Lobby, but rather was concerned with keeping the gen-
eral rule intact without any deviation that might erode the im-
portance of its principle.67 And most certainly there are reasons for
wanting generally applicable rules in the law, not the least of
which, as the dissent points out, includes providing easy-to-define
guidance in future cases.68
3. The Paradigms in Tension
As one might deduce from the prior illustration of the para-
digms, underlying both are elements of reasonable argumentation
and inability to give credence to the other viewpoint.69 Or, put in
perhaps a more positive way:
62. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 768-69 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 769.
64. See id. at 739-40 (focusing not on the individual application of the Court's majority
opinion but on the "startling breadth" of the decision insofar as it can be reduced to a general
principle that businesses can "opt out of any law (saving only tax laws) they judge incom-
patible with their sincerely held religious beliefs").
65. Id. at 741.
66. Id. at 742-43.
67. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text; Corbin, supra note 38, at 1195 (dis-
cussing the competing interest of a county clerk with religious objections to same sex mar-
riage and a same-sex couple's interest in getting a marriage license. As illustrated in that
note, even if there is no definable harm to the individual case at hand, because the general
rule has been violated, the harm is in the erosion of general antidiscrimination principles.).
68. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 770-71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
69. To that end, each side highlights what will support its viewpoint. That is, the ma-
jority opinion highlights the intent and import of RFRA, while the dissenting opinion high-
lights the import and intent of the ACA. Id. at 705-07 (majority opinion), 765-66 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
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[B]oth [sides are] right (albeit from the perspectives of different con-
stituencies), and both [are] wrong (because they ignore[] or marginal-
ize[] other-minded constituencies). [For example,] [s]chool prayer is
not meaningfully neutral: it is inconsistent with the views of, among
others, atheists. Neither is a prohibition on school prayer meaning-
fully neutral, because it rejects the views of citizens who believe on
religious grounds that school prayer is desirable or obligatory. Given
such a conflict in views, no neutral position is available. There may,
of course, be good prudential or constitutional or even philosophical or
theological reasons for preferring one or the other position. But we can
describe one of the positions as "neutral" only by neglecting to notice
those citizens whose deeply held beliefs are thereby rejected.
70
In essence, underlying both paradigms is the practical reality
that in order to respect the other's position, there must be "equal
concern and respect," which often would require a change in "in-
ternal attitudes, intentions, beliefs, and understandings."7 1 With
two paradigms as dichotomous as the ones discussed supra, such
mutual understanding can be elusive at best.72 Regardless, the
shifting between the two paradigms has historic roots that have
led to the current position, with the prevalence of the protection
paradigm signaled in Hobby Lobby and applied to the First Amend-
ment context in Masterpiece.
II. APPLICATION OF THE PROTECTION PARADIGM TO FREE
EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
As Hobby Lobby was in the context of RFRA, one might ask what
it has to do with First Amendment jurisprudence. This is where
the Court's opinion in Masterpiece, although not an employment
law case, becomes crucial to the discussion.
In Masterpiece, the Court grappled with the dichotomy of para-
digms as it relates to wedding vendors with religious objections to
using their businesses to provide goods and services for same-sex
70. SMITH, supra note 5, at 131.
71. Id. at 154-55.
72. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 730 (majority opinion) (holding that HHS's argument
"reflects a judgment about the importance of religious liberty" that was not justified by the
intent of the law that HHS was operating under); id. at 744 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that religious beliefs are "personal opinion[s]" that should not be given weight when
compared to "the practice of medicine"); see also SMITH, supra note 5, at 154 (stating that
proponents of opposing paradigms often are "inordinately certain of their [own] views" and
dismiss "contrary views as the product of ignorance, willful error, or hypocrisy").
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weddings.73 Specifically, in 2012, a Colorado bakery owner in-
formed a same-sex couple that he would not create a cake for their
wedding due to his religious opposition to same-sex marriages.74
The bakery owner was a devout Christian who maintained that he
tried to uphold the teachings of Jesus Christ "in all aspects of his
life," including his vocation as a baker and shop owner.75 Because
his religious beliefs were that marriage is between one man and
one woman, "creating a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding
would be equivalent to participating in a celebration that is con-
trary" to his deeply held religious beliefs.76 He believed that "to
create a wedding cake for an event that celebrates something that
directly goes against the teachings of the Bible, would have been a
personal endorsement and participation in the ceremony and rela-
tionship . . . enter[ed] into."77
The couple filed a discrimination complaint against the baker
and his cakeshop pursuant to a Colorado statute, the Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Act ("CADA"), that prohibits discrimination
in places of public accommodation.78 CADA includes sexual orien-
tation among its classes of citizens against which discrimination is
prohibited.79 Ultimately, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission
(the "Commission") found in favor of the couple and ordered the
baker to sell same-sex couples wedding cakes (if the baker would
be selling to heterosexual couples), train staff on CADA, submit
quarterly compliance reports documenting denials of service for
two years, and submit a statement describing remedial actions
taken.80 In making this decision, the Commission made a number
of comments targeted towards the baker's religious justification for
his objection.8 1 At one point, the Commission stated that "religion
73. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723
(2018).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1724.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1725 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a)).
79. Id. CADA claims are first investigated for probable cause by the Colorado Civil
Rights Division. Id. If the Division finds probable cause, it refers the case to the Civil Rights
Commission. Id. If a formal hearing is warranted, the claim is heard first by an Adminis-
trative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Id. The ALJ's decision may be appealed to the full Civil Rights
Commission, which will hold a public hearing and deliberative session before voting on the
case. Id. If the Commission upholds an ALJ's decision finding a violation, it may impose
statutorily authorized remedial measures. Id.
80. Id. at 1726.
81. Id. at 1729.
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has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout his-
tory" and that "it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric
that people can use."82 The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the
Commission's decision,83 and the Colorado Supreme Court declined
to hear the case.84
A. The Protection Paradigm Prevails
The Supreme Court granted review, and the majority opinion
contains the same indicia of using the protection paradigm as the
majority opinion in Hobby Lobby.85 The central characteristic of
the protection paradigm is, again, overtly present in this opinion.
Specifically, the Court made quite clear that courts and govern-
ment decision makers cannot pass judgment on the reasonable-
ness, correctness, or importance of a person's expressed religious
beliefs.86 No government official gets to decide what is "orthodox"
in matters of religion and cannot presuppose the illegitimacy of re-
ligious practices.87 The Court went to great lengths to point out the
"religious hostility" of the Commission in this case.88 It found that
the Commission's comments implied that "religious beliefs and
persons are less than fully welcome in Colorado's business commu-
nity," "endorsed the view that religious beliefs cannot legitimately
82. Id.
83. See Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015).
84. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1726-27.
85. Unlike Hobby Lobby, Masterpiece was a much more fractured decision. Compare
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 690 (2014) (consisting of the opinion and one
concurrence), with Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1722 (consisting of the opinion and three con-
currences). Although Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Alito, and Kagan joined
Justice Kennedy's opinion, Justices Kagan, Breyer, Gorsuch, and Alito either wrote or joined
in concurring opinions clarifying their positions on the freedom of religion and antidiscrim-
ination concerns balance. See Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1722; see id. at 1732-34 (Kagan, J.,
concurring); see id. at 1734-40 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Justice Thomas concurred in part
and in the judgment but wrote separately for this same reason and to address the free
speech issue, not relevant here. See id. at 1740-48 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Gins-
burg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined. Id. at 1748 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
86. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1723-24 (majority opinion) (confronting the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission's seeming unwillingness to adjudicate the question before it with-
out "religious hostility").
87. Id. at 1731 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
88. Id. at 1723-24. Interestingly, the rhetoric used by the Commission is the type of
"embittered discourse" that Professor Smith warned in 2014 has had a "deleterious effect"
on the ability of those who view these issues through dichotomous paradigms to have open
and respectful dialogue that leads to a balance between opposing interests. SMITH, supra
note 5, at 124-26.
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be carried into the public sphere," and used "inappropriate and dis-
missive comments showing [a] lack of due consideration for [the
baker's] free exercise rights and the dilemma he faced."89 The
Court stated that some of the more inflammatory comments dis-
paraged religion in two ways, one of which was by "characterizing
it as merely rhetorical-something insubstantial and even insin-
cere."90 In essence, the Court determined that the Commission had
failed to look at the situation from the religious objector's point of
view, but instead substituted its own judgment and viewpoints.
This can be seen, as the Court points out, by the Commission's
failure to treat the baker with the same deference to conscience-
based refusal as other similarly situated bakers.91 Specifically, the
Commission allowed conscience-based refusals in the past to other
bakers who deemed the requested wording and images "deroga-
tory," "hateful," or "discriminatory."92 The Commission stated that
the baker at issue in Masterpiece, however, could not have the mes-
sage of the cake in question attributable to him, whereas the other
bakers were not subject to this type of logic.93 The fact that the
other bakers were willing to sell other products to the client was
taken into account, whereas the fact that the baker in Masterpiece
was willing to sell other types of cakes and desserts to the couple
at issue was "irrelevant." 94 Simply put, the Commission did not
89. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.
90. Id. The Court was especially direct on this point as the Commission had allowed
other bakers to refuse to create cakes with images and words that those bakers deemed
morally objectionable; specifically, that the bakers deemed derogatory and conveyed disap-
proval of same-sex marriage, along with religious text. Id. at 1730. Essentially, the Com-
mission allowed conscience-based objections, so long as they were not based on religion. Id.
91. Id. at 1729; Stephanie Barclay, Opinion, Supreme Court's Cakeshop Ruling Is Not
Narrow-and That's a Good Thing, HILL (June 6, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opini
on/judiciary/391004-supreme-courts-cakeshop-ruling-is-not-narrow-and-thats-a-good-thing
(pointing out one aspect of the Court's opinion that has broad implications is its refusal to
allow double standards that disfavor religious individuals while favoring others) [https:
//perma.cc/QTS9-NHK9].
92. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1730 (quoting Colo. Dep't of Regulatory Agencies, Jack v.
Gateaux, Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X, at 4 (2015); Colo. Dep't of Regulatory Agencies,
Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X, at 3 (2015); Colo. Dep't of Regulatory Agen-
cies, Jack v. Le Bakery Sensual, Inc., Charge No. P20140070X, at 3 (2015)).
93. Id.
94. Id. Professor Smith foreshadowed this very situation when he warned about the
inconsistency of decisions when too much emphasis is put on beliefs and motives, especially
in a biased fashion. SMITH, supra note 5, at 155. "From the perspective," he wrote, "of this
concern for beliefs and motives, a governmental act that might be perfectly acceptable if
done with a proper secular purpose is unconstitutional if done with (or if perceived as hav-
ing) an unapproved invidious purpose." Id. (citing McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844
(2005)).
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view the case by placing itself in the shoes of the baker, but rather
viewed his religious objections through a less deferential lens than
it viewed objections on other secular bases.95
Ensuring that religion is respected in and of itself, regardless of
its popularity in modern society, is a hallmark of the protection
paradigm, as is the determination that the government does not
get to make the determination of reasonableness or offensiveness
of religious beliefs.96 Thus, the Court was reaffirming Hobby
95. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1730-31.
96. Before moving on to other indicia of shifting paradigms favoring protecting religious
exercise, it is important to note the implications of the fractured nature of this opinion. See
supra note 85. That is, without going into laborious detail here, the paradigm set forth in
Justice Kagan's concurring opinion is much more in line with the subordination paradigm.
Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (Kagan, J., concurring). Justice Gorsuch's concurring opin-
ion, to the contrary, is much more in line with the protection paradigm. Id. at 1734 (Gorsuch,
J., concurring). Thus, from a paradigm perspective, a view of the Masterpiece opinions sup-
ports a conclusion that Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Gorsuch, Alito, and Thomas ap-
pear to be inclined to view these cases from the protection paradigm. Justices Kagan,
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor appear to be inclined to view these cases from the subor-
dination paradigm.
That being said, not all cases will be treated exactly the same by a particular Justice, of
course. The summer of 2020 brought with it a number of cases that support the shift towards
a protection paradigm at the United States Supreme Court level, although the individual
Justices supporting the majority opinion varied slightly. See, e.g., Little Sisters of the Poor
Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't
of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020). Though these cases will not be extensively analyzed
here, the trend towards the protection paradigm is worth noting.
Even the few cases that seem contradictory to this trend, upon closer inspection, do not
necessarily indicate the contrary. For example, at least one decision from Chief Justice Rob-
erts appears to call into question his leanings towards the protection paradigm. See S. Bay
United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concur-
ring) (denying relief to religious institutions to enjoin "temporary numerical restrictions on
public gatherings" that addressed the spread of the coronavirus). However, Newsom in-
volved a request for an injunction, which places a high burden on petitioners to show that
their legal rights are "indisputably clear" and is even then only rarely granted in "the most
critical and exigent circumstances." Id. (quoting Stephen M. Shapiro et al., SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE § 17.4, at 17-9 (11th ed. 2019)). Furthermore, little has inspired more widespread
fear and caution than the coronavirus pandemic. See Ed Yong, Our Pandemic Summer,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/04/pandemic-
summer-coronavirus-reopening-back-normal/609940/ [https://perma.cc/X3L9-KP2L]; Jane
E. Brody, Managing Coronaoirus Fears, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/04/13/well/mind/coronavirus-fear-anxiety-health.html [https://perma.cc/HHB6-
PGPX]. Thus, this decision is more likely a product of stringent legal standards in the face
of an unprecedented health crisis, rather than a deviation from the protection paradigm.
Presuming that Chief Justice Roberts continues to view cases from a protection paradigm,
the future of these cases will, thus, come down to Justice Kavanaugh's vote. If the decision
in American Legion and Justice Kavanaugh's support of a recent concurring opinion on a
denial of certiorari is any indication, the protection paradigm may prevail for some time.
See infra notes 158-81, 184, 192 and accompanying text. Further supporting this conclusion
are Justice Kavanaugh's support in Little Sisters and Espinoza and his dissent from the
Court's denial of injunctive relief in Newsom, wherein he disagreed with the Court's conclu-
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Lobby's analytical paradigm that decision makers need to put
themselves in the shoes of the religious believer and ask them-
selves, if they believed as this person, would their free exercise of
religion be restricted or burdened.
Additionally, the Court pointed to the need to have an individu-
alized, fact-intensive, specific-context inquiry.97 The Court reaf-
firmed the government's obligations to protect certain classes of
citizens in the exercise of their civil rights, such as gay persons,
who are at risk of being "treated as social outcasts or as inferior in
dignity and worth."98 Nevertheless, the Court did not lose its focus
on individual determination of the case in light of this important
principle. Rather, it juxtaposed this necessary consideration with
another. That is, that "the First Amendment ensures that religious
organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek
to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their
lives and faiths."99 To that end, the Court did not view this as a
case from which to derive a general principle about whether a
baker could refuse to sell any goods or any cakes for gay weddings
in general.100 Rather, the Court did not discount the baker's view
of the case as a specific question of whether use of the baker's ar-
tistic skills to make an expressive creation conveyed a message
that he could not express consistent with his religious beliefs.10 1 In
fact, the Court recognized that a decision in favor of the baker by
Colorado could have been tenable, with the need to be sufficiently
constrained to avoid a serious social stigma on gay persons, again
a conclusion that understands the need to be fact specific.10 2
sion that churches were being treated the same as secular businesses for purposes of relax-
ing safety guidelines during the coronavirus pandemic. Little Sisters, 140 S. Ct. at 2367;
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2246; Newsom, 140 S. Ct. at 1614 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). In-
deed, in his dissent, Justice Kavanaugh uses distinctly protectionist language and logic that
decries "inexplicably" applying restrictions to one group but exempting another, which
"do[es] much to burden religious freedom." Newsom, 140 S. Ct. at 1614-15 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 2020)).
97. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1723 (stating that the details of refusal, i.e., refusal to
attend the wedding to cut the cake versus refusal to put certain religious words on the cake,
might make a difference in the outcome of whether the baker has a valid free exercise claim).
98. Id. at 1727.
99. Id. (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 679-80 (2015)).
100. Id. at 1727-28.
101. Id. at 1728 (finding that the baker's dilemma was "particularly understandable,"
especially in light of the fact that same sex marriage was not recognized in Colorado at the
time).
102. Id. at 1728-29. Though indicia of the subordination paradigm were reflected in the
dissenting and one of the concurring opinions in Masterpiece, as this Article focuses on the
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B. The Paradigms in Action: An Illustration
The battle of the concurring opinions in Masterpiece truly re-
flects the importance of what happens when a paradigm is used to
view a case. Both Justice Kagan's and Justice Gorsuch's concurring
opinions addressed the issue of whether the Commission could
have legitimately accommodated those bakers who refused to pro-
vide service to customers based on nonreligious moral standards
regarding what they found objectionable messaging, without ac-
commodating a baker's objection based on religious moral stand-
ards regarding what he found objectionable messaging.10 3 Justice
Kagan's concurring opinion argued that it could. Justice Kagan
reasoned that refusing to create a cake that has anti-gay and reli-
gious messaging does not discriminate on the basis of religion be-
cause declining to create the cake would have happened whether
the customer was a religious believer of any denomination or a non-
religious person.104 Refusing to create a wedding cake for a same-
sex marriage ceremony, however, discriminates on the basis of sex-
ual orientation.105 This is because, using the paradigm through
which Justice Kagan views the case, the product at issue for com-
parison is defined not as a cake of a specific message, but broadly
as a "wedding cake" sold to heterosexual couples but not homosex-
ual couples.106 This is where the paradigm reference is important.
As Justice Gorsuch's concurrence illustrates, using a different
paradigm through which to view the case, the product at issue is
defined not broadly as any "wedding cake," but specifically as a
"same-sex wedding" cake.107 Viewing the case through this lens,
the baker in Masterpiece did not discriminate based on the specific
customer at issue. It did not matter whether the customer was a
homosexual person or a heterosexual person; the baker was not
prevailing paradigm, those parallels will not be addressed here.
103. Id. at 1732-40 (Kagan, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 1733-34.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1733.
107. Id. at 1734-40 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). As Justice Gorsuch states in his concurring
opinion, "We are told here, however, to apply a sort of Goldilocks rule: describing the cake
by its ingredients is too general; understanding it as celebrating a same-sex wedding is too
specific; but regarding it as a generic wedding cake is just right." Id. at 1738. Where one
falls on this sliding scale depends on which paradigm lens one is looking through.
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going to create a cake of that specific message regardless of who
might be purchasing the cake.108
Using the protection paradigm to view Justice Kagan's logic re-
sults in a conclusion that if the baker who refused to provide ser-
vice to the same-sex couple was acting discriminatorily, the other
bakers who refused to provide service regarding anti-gay and reli-
gious messaging were as well. This is because, as Justice Gorsuch
pointed out, cakes that celebrate same-sex weddings will usually
be purchased by same-sex couples in the same way that cakes ex-
pressing objection to same-sex weddings will usually be purchased
by religious customers.109 As a consequence, the "effect" of these
actions is on a protected class of citizens in either case.11 0
This give and take between the two concurring opinions illus-
trates how the dichotomy of paradigms interacts with the facts of
a given case in trying to balance protection of religious liberties
with other antidiscrimination interests. Fittingly, the Court pre-
sented the question in Masterpiece as the "proper reconciliation of
at least two principles . . . the authority [of government] to protect
the rights and dignity of gay persons [and] the right of all persons
to exercise fundamental freedoms under the First Amendment.""1
Ultimately, that balance will be resolved in light of the prevailing
paradigm in any particular era.1 12
III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROTECTION PARADIGM IN THE FIRST
AMENDMENT CONTEXT
Some have argued that the Supreme Court "punted" in Master-
piece by refusing to determine the appropriate balance between re-
ligious liberties and other antidiscrimination interests.113 With the
108. Id. at 1734-36.
109. Id. at 1736.
110. Id. at 1735-36.
111. Id. at 1723 (majority opinion). Specifically, the Court was addressing the authority
of states and their governmental entities to protect such rights under the First Amendment
as applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
112. Professor Tebbe talks about this phenomenon, albeit to highlight a different princi-
ple. TEBBE, supra note 7, at 31. He argues that a person's "perspective and purposes influ-
ence the way they put together their commitments on questions of constitutional signifi-
cance." Id. Though he argues that decision makers can reflect on their judgments, decisions,
and logic in this respect, he does acknowledge that generally "people experience moral prob-
lems from a particular viewpoint." Id. at 31-32.
113. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Masterpiece Cakeshop: A Romer for Religious Objectors?,
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Court's determination that "[w]hatever the confluence of speech
and free exercise principles," the Colorado Civil Rights Commis-
sion was so overtly prejudiced against the baker's religious view-
points that its decision could not stand,14 the argument goes, there
is little to take away from Masterpiece that would help determine
the future of this balancing question.115
The practical implications for religious freedom cases moving
forward illustrate that Masterpiece is indeed telling, however.116
The Court's opinion reinforces the expansive Hobby Lobby protec-
tion paradigm. That this paradigm has been applied in the First
Amendment context signals a trend toward the broadening of Free
Exercise jurisprudence in a way that has not been seen since the
pre-Smith era, regardless of the fact that Smith has not been for-
mally overruled. 117
In fact, some scholars had begun to question the "specialness of
religion" as it had become "no longer clear that constitutional law
should treat religious belief as special."118 The Court in Master-
piece, however, pronounced that government decision makers must
take special care to look at religious viewpoints with respect and
in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2017-2018, at 139-42,148-49 (2018) (calling the Master-
piece decision "less dramatic, as the decision put off" the substantive questions dealing with
the scope of religious liberty when objecting to actions that implicate antidiscrimination
interests on the basis of sexual orientation, but ultimately concluding that the decision
might be a precursor to more impactful religious-liberty favorable decisions in the future);
Simson, supra note 12, at 538 (calling the Masterpiece decision "anticlimactic" and stating
it did not "hav[e] anything in particular to do with exemption claims").
114. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1723-24.
115. See generally supra note 112.
116. See Barclay, supra note 91 (stating that the Masterpiece decision has broad impli-
cations in at least three significant respects). Professor Barclay argues that the Court's de-
cision has three broad implications: it reaffirmed that (1) religious liberties and people must
be treated equally, (2) religious hostility is per se unconstitutional, and (3) dignitary harm
cannot trump First Amendment rights. Id.; see also Berg, supra note 113, at 140-42 (hy-
pothesizing that the Masterpiece decision could be a "prelude to broader protection for reli-
gious dissenters whose beliefs clash with sexual orientation nondiscrimination laws").
117. See Berg, supra note 113, at 151 (stating that the decision in Masterpiece creates
"seeds for later decisions to expand the rights [the Court] recognized").
118. TEBBE, supra note 7, at 4-5. Professor Tebbe is not the only scholar convinced that
religious freedom is in jeopardy. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 5, at 11; Lucas, supra note 33,
at 61 (citing CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND
THE CONSTITUTION 6 (2007)); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regret-
table Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555, 559-60
(1998); Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 639 (2015) (stating that "it is not clear, as
others have argued, that religion should be treated as unique or as an anomaly with regard




understanding, even if to do otherwise is based on the effect it may
have on other protected classes.119 After all, as the Court pointed
out, government actors are protecting "against discrimination on
the basis of religion as well as sexual orientation." 120 It appeared
the Commission forgot this charge when it made a decision that
did not start with viewing the situation with an attempt to under-
stand and respect the religious viewpoint at issue.121 The Court re-
iterated that the government can have no role in deciding, or even
suggesting, that religious objections are legitimate or illegiti-
mate.122 Justice Gorsuch, concurring in Masterpiece, wrote, "Popu-
lar religious views are easy enough to defend. It is protecting un-
popular religious beliefs that we prove this country's commitment
to serving as a refuge for religious freedom." 123
As the protection paradigm may be the prevailing viewpoint on
the Court for some time, 124 it is important to understand that it
signals a shift in how the Court will view future cases and issues,
from public accommodation, to healthcare requirements, to strik-
ing the proper balance between religious freedom interests and an-
tidiscrimination interests in the public employment context.125
119. Unfortunately, government hostility against religion is not rare. See Barclay, supra
note 91. As Professor Barclay points out, however, the Court's opinion (and this paradigm)
essentially makes that type of hostility per se unconstitutional. Id. That is, the government
was not given a chance to justify its hostility, it was simply not tolerated. Id.
120. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729
(2018).
121. Id. at 1731 (holding that the Commission's consideration of the baker's case was
"based on a negative normative 'evaluation of the particular justification' for his objection
and the religious grounds for it").
122. Id. Justice Gorsuch's concurring opinion highlights this point and expresses concern
that allowing secular commitments to justify accommodation from a generally applicable
law, but not religious commitments, indicates a "judgmental dismissal" of sincerely held
religious beliefs. Id. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). But see Justice Kagan's concurrence,
asserting that allowing this disparity of treatment would not violate the Free Exercise
Clause because the bakers who refused based on secular moral grounds were not discrimi-
nating against the requesting customers on the basis of religion. Id. at 1733-34 (Kagan, J.,
concurring).
123. Id. at 1737 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
124. See supra note 96; infra note 184.
125. The paradigm may manifest itself in various ways, including constitutional juris-
prudence, statutory jurisprudence, or issues of practice and procedure. See supra notes 20,
96. For example, in listing possible religious exceptions to statutorily protected classifica-
tions in the employment discrimination context, the Court recently emphasized statutory
methods. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1747 (2020). Bostock is not directly
relevant to the focus of this Article, in the sense that the Court did not address the tension
between religious freedom claims and antidiscrimination interests. Id. at 1754 (emphasiz-
ing that because a religious liberty claim was abandoned on appeal, no such claim was be-
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IV. APPLICATION IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT: IN GENERAL
AND THE UNIQUE CASE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
Many religious citizens cannot divorce the practice of their reli-
gion from their daily tasks, including their vocations.126 Those with
sincerely held religious beliefs may view their religion as ingrained
in their personhood such that their work lives are integral to their
religious identities, and therefore central to their religious prac-
tice.127 In the employment context, therefore, the choice might be
between a person's religious beliefs and their livelihood.128 Thus,
when free exercise includes the freedom to engage in action or in-
action, as well as belief, the implications in the employment con-
text can be quite broad.129
fore the Court). Nevertheless, Justice Gorsuch, who authored the majority opinion, did em-
phasize a "deep[] concern[] with preserving the promise of the free exercise of religion en-
shrined in our Constitution; [which] guarantee lies at the heart of our pluralistic society."
Id. Justice Gorsuch then listed the various constitutional and statutory exemptions that
could operate to protect religious liberties when and if they come into conflict with the
Court's inclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity as protected classifications from
employment discrimination pursuant o Title VII. Id. Though mentioning the First Amend-
ment only in its limited ministerial exception context, he then expressly referenced RFRA
as operating as a kind of "super statute" that could "supersede Title VII's commands in
appropriate cases." Id. Thus, although Bostock does not provide additional judicial direction
as it relates to balancing religious liberties and antidiscrimination interests-or in the spe-
cific context of First Amendment jurisprudence outside the very limited ministerial excep-
tion-this Article would be remiss in not pointing out the brief reference and invitation of
the Court to more fully litigate the interplay between religious liberties and antidiscrimi-
nation interests in the employment context, specifically through statutory methods.
126. Corbin, supra note 38, at 1251 (acknowledging that without standards allowing ac-
commodation for religious free exercise, some "hardworking, devout people" might have to
"choose between their faith and public employment" and thus "find themselves precluded
from government positions").
127. In early Christendom, for example, religion was not viewed as a separate and "dis-
tinct category of life or practice or belief." SMITH, supra note 5, at 78. Rather, such divisions
can be seen as a "modern invention." Id. Even so, modern human resource best practices are
moving towards including religious diversity recognition in employment policies. See Dori
Meinert, How to Make Holiday Celebrations More Inclusive, HR MAG. (Oct. 31, 2018), https:
/www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/1 1 18/pages/how-to-make-holiday-celebrations-
more-inclusive.aspx [https://perma.cc/8WWA-REGG]. Employers are cautioned that "[flor
many employees, their religion helps define them as people" and that employees cannot
bring their whole selves to work if they "are worried about hiding an essential element of
who they are, such as their deeply held religious beliefs." Id.
128. See TEBBE, supra note 7, at 33-34; see also Lucas, supra note 33, at 68 (stating
"religious identity ... may be viewed as immutable and thus non-negotiable in the face of
possible conflict").
129. The concept that free exercise includes acts as well as beliefs has been implicitly
imbedded in Free Exercise jurisprudence by such examples as holding that exercise of reli-
gion includes "not only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention from)"
acts. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990); see also Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 710 (2014). Nevertheless, the reach of protected
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BALANCING RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES
A. Implications in the Employment Context in General
There are any number of scenarios where the balance between
protecting religious freedom interests of employees and/or employ-
ers will be directly at odds with other antidiscrimination interests
in the employment context. For example, employees might face los-
ing their jobs, or other discipline, at religiously affiliated institu-
tions due to using medical methods not supported by the relevant
religion or having children without being married.130 Alternatively,
employers may face religious exemption claims for disciplining em-
ployees who refuse to abide by antidiscrimination policies, such as
using preferred gender pronouns.131 Or, in the benefits realm, em-
ployers may refuse to extend insurance coverage to the same-sex
spouse of an employee due to religious objections.132 Other exam-
ples could include an employee who wishes to wear a particular
item of religious clothing at work that is against a dress code pol-
icy, or an employee who audibly prays during the work day to the
discomfort of other employees.
Additionally, the fact that there are statutory mechanisms in
place to bring employment discrimination claims does not, in and
of itself, render the First Amendment discussion irrelevant.133 Of-
tentimes, concerns that shape constitutional claims shape the stat-
utory ones, and vice-versa, as can be seen by the interplay between
Hobby Lobby and Masterpiece.134 Especially in the context of public
acts has been a matter of debate. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 709-10. The Court in Hobby
Lobby extended the protected acts to business practices by finding that they "fall comforta-
bly within" the definition of exercise of religion. Id. at 710; see also id. at 709-10 (focusing
on how employment-related decisions can affect to what extent a person can freely exercise
religious beliefs). As Justice Kennedy said in his concurrence,
In our constitutional tradition, freedom means that all persons have the right
to believe or strive to believe in a divine creator and a divine law. For those
who choose this course, free exercise is essential in preserving their own dig-
nity and in striving for a self-definition shaped by their religious precepts. Free
exercise in this sense implicates more than just freedom of belief. It means,
too, the right to express those beliefs and to establish one's religious (or nonre-
ligious) self-definition in the political, civic, and economic life of our larger com-
munity.
Id. at 736 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
130. These examples ummarize those utilized by Professor Tebbe in his book, Religious
Freedom, which were based on facts from actual cases. TEBBE, supra note 7, at 143, 241
nn.3-5.
131. Id. at 143, 241 n.4.
132. Id. at 143-44, 241 n.5.
133. See Corbin, supra note 38, at 1239; supra note 20.
134. See supra section I.C & Part II and accompanying text (discussing the interplay
between Hobby Lobby and Masterpiece).
2020] 967
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
employment, where employers have to be concerned not only with
protecting the free exercise of religion, but also with not violating
the Establishment Clause, the question of where the Supreme
Court strikes the balance is of particular importance.
B. The Particular Challenge of the Protection Paradigm as
Applied to Public Employment
As an initial matter, due to the statutory mechanisms to bring
employment discrimination claims on the basis of religion, reli-
gious freedoms are already generally given greater protection in
the employment context than other areas of law.135 It might be
tempting, therefore, to conclude that Masterpiece does not have a
significant impact in the area of employment law in general. In the
context of public employment, however, the protection paradigm
currently prevailing after Masterpiece has the potential for signif-
icant impacts. This is because in some contexts, government em-
ployee actions are attributable to the government itself.136 In these
cases, the action or inaction pursuant to accommodating employee
religious exercise may violate the Establishment Clause,137 and it
is not a novel concept that the two religion clauses are frequently
in tension.138
135. See TEBBE, supra note 7, at 144-45; supra note 20 (discussing RFRA and Title VII
as statutory alternatives to bringing employment discrimination claims).
136. See Berry v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding the
discipline of a county social services employee who discussed religion with his clients, dis-
played religious items in his cubicle, and used a conference room for prayer meetings on the
basis that these actions implicated Establishment Clause concerns for the public employer);
see also Corbin, supra note 38, at 1207.
137. U.S. CoNST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion ... "); see Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (holding that the Establish-
ment Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Corbin,
supra note 38, at 1207. Although the Establishment Clause references "laws," it has been
applied to government actions, practices, policies, and involvements. See, e.g., Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983) (addressing a state legislature's practice of beginning
each session with a prayer); Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1989) (ad-
dressing holiday displays on public property); Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 139 S.
Ct. 2067, 2074 (2019) (plurality opinion) (addressing the display and maintenance of, and
expenditure of public funds for, a Latin cross on public land). But see Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct.
at 2095 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the Establishment Clause only applies to duly
enacted laws).
138. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981) (rec-
ognizing the "tension between the two Religious Clauses" but dismissing it as overcome
through Supreme Court precedent); see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 230-31 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing the difficulty in defining the
"just bounds" between distinguishing the realm of "the business of civil government from
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BALANCING RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES
As the Establishment Clause is the mechanism by which our
Constitution assures its citizens that the government will not favor
one religion over another, or religion over nonreligion-a question
of discrimination-the discussion regarding the appropriate bal-
ance between protection of religious liberties and antidiscrimina-
tion interests is germane to the balance between the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause context.
1. The Establishment Clause Interplay
Striking this balance between the Free Exercise and the Estab-
lishment Clauses is not a well-developed area of law in the public
employment context.139 However, there are a number of situations
in which the Clauses might come into tension in public employ-
ment. For example, a government employee may refuse to perform
official duties, violate an employer policy, or need an exemption or
specific accommodation for religious observance, all based on oth-
erwise violating religious tenets.140 Should the government em- .
ployer approve an accommodation, is it thereby favoring one reli-
gion over another or religion over nonreligion in a way that violates
the Establishment Clause? Similarly, if one of its employees freely
exercises religion during work hours pursuant to an accommoda-
tion, will that exercise be attributable to the government in such a
way that it is thereby "endorsing" religion? Before delving further
into these questions and the unique situation of public employees
and employers, a basic overview of relevant Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is helpful.
that of religion" and stating "[t]he fact is that the line which separates the secular from the
sectarian in American life is elusive" (quoting John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration,
in 35 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1, 2 (Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952)).
139. See Corbin, supra note 38, at 1195.
140. See id. at 1195 nn.1-2, 1203 n.48. Professor Corbin specifically notes the cases of a
clerk refusing to issue a marriage license, a city bus driver insisting on wearing a hijab in
violation of a dress code, a police officer refusing a post with a gaming commission (due to
religious objections to gambling), and a government employee who needs time off for a reli-
gious observance. Id.
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a. Historical Context
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is not as clear or linear as
would lend itself to succinct summary here.141 In its basic charac-
terization, and with at least one significant deviation, Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence erected a wall of separation between
church and state until the early 1960s.142 This coincided well with
the Court's more stringent interpretation of religious liberties pur-
suant to the Free Exercise Clause during that same timeframe,
discussed supra.143 However, with the sympathetic accommodation
of religious liberties from 1960 to 1990, the separationist leaning
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence was in tension with the
Free Exercise jurisprudence.144 As one scholar noted, the Free Ex-
ercise jurisprudence of the 1960s "required the government to ex-
tend to religious individuals special consideration for exemptions
when they felt burdened by state action."14 5 But the Establishment
Clause jurisprudence appeared to prohibit government from ad-
vancing religion over nonreligion.146 Thus, Establishment Clause
jurisprudence "seemed to prohibit the preferential action de-
manded by the Court's Free Exercise Clause" jurisprudence.14 7
Starting in 1971, the Court began using multiple tests to deter-
mine whether government action violated the Establishment
Clause, but never abandoned the underlying separation of church
141. See Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2080 (stating that the Court "grappl[ed]" with Estab-
lishment Clause cases for more than twenty years before "ambitiously attempt[ing] to distill
from the Court's existing case law a test that would bring order and predictability");
VINCENT PHILLIP MUNOZ, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT: THE
ESSENTIAL CASES AND DOCUMENTS 1-5 (2013) (acknowledging that the doctrines adopted
by the Supreme Court "have not always been consistent and perhaps not even coherent,"
but stating that in general Establishment Clause jurisprudence through the early 1960s
was strictly separationist but with at least one deviation); SMITH, supra note 5, at 113-20
(detailing the complicated and at times irreconcilable history of Establishment Clause ju-
risprudence).
142. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 216; MUNOZ, supra note 141, at
2-5. But see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (permitting, under the Establish-
ment Clause, public schools to release students during the school day to attend religious
activities and stating "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being").
143. Supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text; MUNOZ, supra note 141, at 7 (stating
that the narrowing of free exercise jurisprudence in the 1990s "helped to alleviate a striking
tension in the Court's church-state jurisprudence").





and state premise.148 This is not to say that there was not a slight
shifting of paradigms, similar to Free Exercise jurisprudence, dur-
ing this timeframe. For example, the Lemon test was critiqued by
some on the Court for its "callous indifference" toward religion.149
Nevertheless, the ultimate premise was separationist.150
In 1971, the Court adopted the Lemon test to determine whether
state action violated the Establishment Clause.151 Pursuant to this
test, government action is not prohibited if it (1) has a secular pur-
pose,1 5 2 (2) does not have the primary effect of either advancing or
inhibiting religion, and (3) does not result in excessive government
entanglement with religion.15 3 However, just two years after the
Court adopted the Lemon test, it questioned its usefulness and only
sporadically employed it thereafter.154 A later test employed by the
Court was the endorsement est, described as an elaboration on the
"effect" prong of the Lemon test, which prohibited government ac-
148. See, e.g., infra notes 151-56; see also MUNOZ, supra note 141, at 711.
149. Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 663-64 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
150. MUNOZ, supra note 141, at 7-11; see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683-84
(2005) (reaffirming the obligation of the Court to "maintain a division between church and
state," while still acknowledging the role religion has played in the nation's history). The
failure to waver from the separationist leanings is interesting, as some scholars assert that
the Establishment Clause was never meant as anything more than a prohibition on creating
a national church, certainly not a decree regarding the separation of church and state as it
has come to be known. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 5, at 57-58. Indeed, at least one Supreme
Court Justice has similarly expressed doubts regarding the separationist underpinnings of
the Establishment Clause. See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2095
(2019) (Thomas, J., concurring). Regardless of this disagreement, however, it is clear that
though the underpinnings of Establishment Clause precedent are separationist, that does
not mean or require complete exclusion of religion in all things government. See, e.g., Bur-
well v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 729-30 (2014) (holding that government
expenditures may be required to accommodate religion in certain circumstances); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (finding that "total separation between church and state
... is not possible in an absolute sense" and that "[s]ome relationship between government
and religious organizations is inevitable").
151. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
152. At least one scholar has noted that religious exemptions to generally applicable laws
would never be allowed under this Establishment Clause standard because government ex-
emptions for purely religious reasons would also violate this prong of having a "secular pur-
pose." Simson, supra note 12, at 542-43. Professor Simson goes on to note, however, that
such a literal reading of this test would not effectuate the purposes or balance between the
two religion clauses because courts would be constitutionally required to protect free exer-
cise on the one hand, but prohibited from ordering relief on the other. Id. at 543.
153. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
154. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 685, 686 nn.4-5 (providing a succinct summary of Court
cases that have applied and declined to apply the Lemon test).
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tion that intends to convey a message of endorsement or disap-
proval of religion.155 Another test was the coercion test, which pro-
hibited government actions that (1) coerced anyone to support or
participate in any religion or its exercise and (2) granted direct
benefits in such a way that established a religion or tended to do
So. 156
Most recently in American Legion, five Justices on the Court
acknowledged that no one test or standard will work in all in-
stances, and each expressed preference for case-by-case or situa-
tion-specific standards.157
b. The Court's Decision in American Legion
In American Legion, the American Humanist Association
brought suit against the Maryland-National Capital Park and
Planning Commission for the removal, demolition, or alteration of
a thirty-two-foot tall Latin cross located on public land and serving
as a WWI memorial.158 In rejecting the argument that the cross
violated the Establishment Clause, the Court held that "[t]he pas-
sage of time gives rise to a strong presumption of constitutionality"
for established, even if religiously expressive, monuments, sym-
bols, or practices based on four considerations.159 In using these
considerations, the Court declined to apply any of the tests previ-
ously discussed. 160 Instead, its standard was specifically tailored to
155. See Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2080 (plurality opinion); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). But see Caroline Mala Corbin, Opportunistic
Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 617, 622, 636-37
(2019) (setting forth the endorsement test of the Court as a stand-alone test).
156. Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659-65 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also Corbin, supra note 155, at 638-40
(discussing the coercion test).
157. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2082-87, 2089-90 (implicitly rejecting the above tests, at
least in the context of religious monuments and displays, by failing to utilize them and in-
stead using a situation-specific standard); id. at 2080-81 (stating expressly that the Lemon
test is unworkable in many instances); id. at 2090-91 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating, in
an opinion in which Justice Kagan joined, that "there is no single formula for resolving
Establishment Clause challenges"); id. at 2094 (Kagan, J., concurring) (stating that, alt-
hough the Court should still adhere to a standard that involves an examination of purpose
and scope, other considerations, like historical context, should be considered on a case-by-
case basis).
158. Id. at 2077-78. The American Legion intervened in defense of the memorial. Id. at
2078.




the context of historical monument cases.161 Specifically, the Court
considered (1) the original purpose for historical monuments, sym-
bols, or practices is not always easy to define; (2) multiple purposes
may have existed or came to exist; (3) originally religious purposes
can evolve into secular purposes; and (4) when a religious symbol
is established with familiarity and historical significance due to
the passage of time, its removal may no longer appear neutral but
aggressively hostile to religion.1 6 2
Viewing the case in light of these considerations, the Court de-
termined that maintaining the cross at issue on public land did not
violate the Establishment Clause.163 In coming to this decision, the
Court pointed to both the cross's secular and religious value and
meaning. 164 Specifically, the Court discussed how the cross, erected
in 1925, had "become a prominent community landmark" express-
ing "the community's grief at the loss of the young men who per-
ished [during WWI], its thanks for their sacrifice, and its dedica-
tion to the ideals for which they fought."165 In addition to this local
secular meaning, the Court went to great lengths to discuss how a
cross has been adopted in many secular contexts in general, and
had thus been transformed from a religious to a secular symbol in
many cases.166 This was particularly true in the WWI memorial
context, where a plain Latin cross, such as the one in American
Legion, had developed into a national symbol of the conflict and the
resultant sacrifices.167
Nevertheless, despite the Court's seeming attempt to distance
the cross from religious meaning, the Court did acknowledge the
inherently Christian symbolism and meaning of a cross.16 8 It also
recited the Christian message clear from the time of the cross's de-
velopment and erection.169 Specifically, the Court quoted the fund-
raising form for the memorial that referenced trust in "God, the
161. See id. at 2085-87, 2089-90.
162. Id. at 2082-85.
163. Id. at 2089.
164. Id. at 2074, 2087, 2089.
165. Id. at 2074; see also id. at 2077 (describing details of the cross monument that ad-
ditionally indicated its intent and symbol as a memorial of the soldiers lost to the community
as a result of WWI); id. at 2085-86 (discussing other secular reasons for wishing to preserve
the monument at issue such as evolution of purpose and traffic-safety concerns).
166. Id. at 2074-75.
167. Id. at 2075-76, 2085.
168. Id. at 2074 ("The cross came into widespread use as a symbol of Christianity by the
fourth century, and it retains that meaning today." (footnote omitted)).
169. Id. at 2076-77.
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Supreme Ruler of the Universe," how the fallen soldiers' spirits
would guide the community in "Godliness," and the motto "One
God, One Country, and One Flag."170 It also noted the numerous
religious references at the dedication ceremony, including an invo-
cation by a Catholic priest, the keynote address stating the cross
was "symbolic of Calvary," and a benediction by a Baptist pastor.17 1
The Court also discussed how religious symbols on a national level
even with no secular purpose are acceptable to "acknowledge[] the
centrality of faith to those whose lives are commemorated."17 2
In light of this history, including the religious and secular mean-
ings of the cross, the Court found that removal or radical alteration
after the cross's establishment in the community for almost a cen-
tury "would be seen by many not as a neutral act but as the mani-
festation of 'a hostility toward religion that has no place in . .. Es-
tablishment Clause traditions."' 173 Far from requiring removal of
religious symbols when a claim of offense is made, the First
Amendment Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses "aim to fos-
ter a society in which people of all beliefs can live together harmo-
niously," and the cross in that case "where it has stood for so many
years is fully consistent with that aim."174 In fact, its removal could
be particularly "evocative, disturbing, and [religiously] divisive" in
a way that the Establishment Clause actually seeks to avoid.175
In making this decision, the Court declined to use the referenced
Establishment Clause tests but favored a situation-specific stand-
ard.176 In addition to this implicit abandonment of a set test or tests
in favor of situation-specific considerations, five Justices expressly
stated that Establishment Clause standards will be situation spe-
cific. 177 Specifically, four Justices stated that the Lemon test's
shortcomings in some cases are insurmountable as it would not al-
low for aspects of religion in government life that are not violative
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2077.
172. Id. at 2086 (discussing Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. memorials, and others, that
incorporate religious symbols to "honor men and women who have played an important role
in the history of our country").
173. Id. at 2074 (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J. con-
curring)).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2085.
176. Supra notes 157, 160-62 and accompanying text.
177. Supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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of the Establishment Clause, such as prayers at legislative meet-
ings, references to deities in words of public officials, and "public
references to God on coins, decrees, and buildings."178 These Jus-
tices also expressly stated that Establishment Clause standards
should "focus[] on the particular issue at hand" as well as looking
to history for guidance.179 In addition to these four, Justice Kagan
joined in a concurrence that expressed the view that "there is no
single formula for resolving Establishment Clause challenges."180
c. Lingering Questions Post-American Legion
With a majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court acknowl-
edging that any test employed by Establishment Clause analysis
depends on context, and abandoning the idea that any one test will
be used by the Court, the question becomes how courts develop
workable standards for evaluating Establishment Clause claims in
relation to the protection paradigm currently reigning in Free Ex-
ercise jurisprudence. But more specifically, how will courts deter-
mine Establishment Clause claims in relation to reigning Free Ex-
ercise jurisprudence in the public employment context?
2. The Establishment Clause and the Protection Paradigm
Interaction in the Public Employment Context
One way to understand how the Free Exercise jurisprudence and
the Establishment Clause jurisprudence interact after Masterpiece
and American Legion is to consider first whether the proposed re-
ligious exercise, the action or inaction at issue, is protected by the
Free Exercise Clause,181 which currently requires the use of the
protection paradigm. If it is, then in theory, no Establishment
178. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2080 (plurality opinion) (authored by Justice Alito, and
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Kavanaugh). The Justices joining
this opinion advocated for a "presumption of constitutionality for longstanding monuments,
symbols, and practices." Id. at 2081-82.
179. Id. at 2087.
180. Id. at 2090 (Breyer, J., concurring). The concurrence also stated that each case must
be determined individually "in light of ... assuring religious liberty and tolerance for all,
avoiding religiously based social conflict, and maintaining that separation of church and
state that allows each to flourish in its 'separate spher[e]."' Id. at 2090-91 (quoting Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (Breyer, J., concurring)). Justice Kagan also wrote sepa-
rately, stating her preference for a purpose and effects inquiry in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence in addition to a case-by-case determination of additional appropriate consid-
erations such as historical context. Id. at 2094 (Kagan, J., concurring).
181. See Simson, supra note 12, at 544.
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Clause claim can be made as the government has a duty to protect
the religious exercise at issue.18 2 In trying to protect religious ex-
ercise above and beyond what -is required by the Free Exercise
Clause, the Establishment Clause comes into play, and the govern-
ment action must be put through an Establishment Clause analy-
sis.183
In practice, of course, the line is rarely that clear, with one side
making arguments that the Free Exercise Clause protects the de-
sired religious action/inaction at issue-thereby negating the ne-
cessity of resorting to the Establishment Clause analysis-and the
other making arguments that the religious action/inaction at issue
is not protected and violates the Establishment Clause. Add to this
that the protection paradigm will allow for potentially more expan-
sive religious freedom of action than has been seen in the last
twenty years, and the balance between what is prohibited by the
Establishment Clause is even less clear but seemingly more lim-
ited.184
In the public employment context, however, the government is
not just sovereign over the citizens at issue, but also their em-
ployer. In this context, the government has different interests at
stake than just the institution of laws to carry out the overarching
will of the electorate.185 It is attempting to conduct the day-to-day
execution of the public's business, and must have some control over
those whom it employs in order to do that in an effective and effi-
cient manner.186 The Supreme Court has recognized this principle
182. Id.
183. Id. As the Court has stated, '"[T]here is room for play in the joints' between the
Clauses," where government action is not compelled by the Free Exercise Clause or prohib-
ited by the Establishment Clause. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005) (quoting
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
184. This Article does not go into depth on the evaluation of the dichotomy of paradigms
to the Court's jurisprudence in the Establishment Clause context. Suffice it to say, however,
that one can see how if a decision maker looks at an Establishment Clause case through the
subordination paradigm, the strong preference is for maintaining greater absence of religion
from government affairs, and the sliding scale will move towards less accommodation of
religious liberties. See SMITH, supra note 5, at 93-94. The opposite is also true. See id. The
Court's decision in American Legion, notwithstanding its effort to justify its decision by sec-
ularizing the symbology of a Christian cross, supports this apparent shift as well, especially
in light of the Court using similar rhetoric as in Masterpiece to convey a message that reli-
gious hostility will not be tolerated in First Amendment jurisprudence. See Am. Legion, 139
S. Ct. at 2089-90 (plurality opinion) (discussing how the American Humanist Association's
brief "strains" to connect the cross at issue with anti-Semitism and the Ku Klux Klan and
calling this strain "disparaging intimations" unsupported by evidence).
185. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006).
186. See id. at 418.
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in its line of decisions regarding the extent to which public employ-
ees retain their free speech rights.187 The Court has said that citi-
zens entering public employment must "by necessity . .. accept cer-
tain limitations" to their freedom because "[g]overnment
employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of con-
trol over their employees' words and actions; without it, there
would be little chance for the efficient provision of public ser-
vices."188
In the balance between religious liberties and other antidiscrim-
ination interests, adding this layer of governmental employer au-
thority to the equation inserts a strain against the protection par-
adigm. To illustrate, consider the situation of an employee taking
an action, or refusing to act, because of a religiously held belief,
and that action or refusal is in direct tension with other antidis-
criniination concerns. For example, consider a police officer who
refuses to patrol a clinic during an anti-abortion rally. The refusal
of the officer to accept an assignment may potentially disrupt the
day-to-day operation of the public's business. Additionally, if the
police department were to allow an accommodation, it may open
itself up to claims that it is acting contrary to the Establishment
Clause by favoring religion over nonreligion pursuant to one or
more of the Establishment Clause tests described previously, such
as the endorsement standard.
Therefore, the balancing question, and consequently the rele-
vant standard, must take into account these differences in a way
that is not acknowledged in a standard Establishment Clause case,
and certainly not in the era of the prevailing protection paradigm
with its expansive religious liberties scope.
3. The Path Forward: A Workable Standard for Public
Employment
The question of how best to balance religious liberties and other
antidiscrimination interests is not a new topic of discussion, and
many scholars have presented weighing measures, standards, and
187. Id. at 418-19.
188. Id. at 418.
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tests.189 This section explores and adapts some of those tests for
workability in the public employment context. 190
As an initial matter, if one were to proceed with the question of
whether the Free Exercise Clause protects the action at issue, the
first inquiry, even after Masterpiece, continues to be whether the
government employer action, policy, or requirement at issue is neu-
tral and generally applicable.191 However, the shift in paradigm ev-
ident in Hobby Lobby and applied to First Amendment jurispru-
dence in Masterpiece-and the recognition by at least five Justices
on the Supreme Court that in the Establishment Clause context a
balancing test should be situation specific-indicates that it is pos-
sible that the "neutral and generally applicable law" inquiry could
be altered in the future.192
Regardless, this standard is unworkable in the employment law
context in light of the fact that most employment law policies, like
dress codes and leave-of-absence policies, will by nature be neutral
and generally applicable. Thus, the test does not actually answer
any question of import, but will always be answer determinative.
Additionally, it does not take into account the fact that "employees
bringing religious liberty claims are not only citizens for whom the
government is their sovereign, but also employees for whom the
government is their boss."193 In some cases, this employment dy-
namic might suggest a more sympathetic incorporation of an em-
189. See, e.g., infra section IV.B.3.a-d.
190. It is beyond the scope of this Article, however, to explain each concept and test in
depth and as originally conceived. Adaptions have been freely made in order to further this
Article's normative view of appropriate future standards and workability in the public em-
ployment contexts. Thus, none of the tests described in this section should be taken as for-
mulated entirely as the original author intended. To examine these tests in depth or for
their original construction, the reader is encouraged to examine the original sources as cited
herein.
191. Corbin, supra note 38, at 1203-04; see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1734 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
192. See supra notes 96, 184; see also Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634,
635 (2019) (Alito, J., joined by Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, concurring in
denial of certiorari) (stating that Smith had "drastically cut back" on Free Exercise protec-
tions and emphasizing that the Court had not been asked to revisit that case in the petition
at hand). It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the likelihood of the Court aban-
doning the "generally applicable" standard here. The balance of this Article focuses not just
on what the current status of the law is, but also what it should be. It is in this context that
this Article proceeds with its recommendations.
193. Corbin, supra note 38, at 1204. In general, this means the government employer
should be given greater control to consider what would or would not be disruptive to the
working environment. Id. at 1233-34.
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ployee's religious identity in the workplace, regardless of the neu-
trality or general applicability of the policy at issue-to the extent
it can be accommodated without violating the Establishment
Clause.194 As such, this "neutral and generally applicable" stand-
ard, though still prevalent today, is unworkable in the public em-
ployment context and should be abandoned as applied to such
cases.
Thus, the tests below would apply if or when the courts formally
acknowledge the unworkability of the "neutral and generally ap-
plicable" rule to sufficiently and appropriately balance religious
liberties and anti-establishment concerns in the public employ-
ment context, when courts are trying to determine the appropriate
balance in the "joints" area between what does not require protec-
tion by the Free Exercise Clause but what is also not prohibited by
the Establishment Clause,195 or in the case of non-neutral actions,
policies, or requirements.
a. Prior Establishment Clause Jurisprudence-No Endorsement
Of the prior-discussed tests in standard Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, the "no endorsement" test has the most significant
and difficult implications for government-employee religious ac-
commodation issues.196 As one scholar has noted, "Rigorously im-
plemented, the no-endorsement doctrine on its face would seem to
condemn a great deal of governmental expression that has been
practiced and valued in the American political tradition, including
the national motto . .. [and] official use of prayer in legislative ses-
sions and presidential inaugurations. .. "197 However, others have
pointed out that it lends itself to important American principles,
such as the government not impairing the citizenship standing of
particular religions or no religion by suggesting its favoritism to a
particular religion.198 In the public employee context, this could in-
clude non-endorsement of a discriminatory message.199
194. See, e.g., supra note 127.
195. See supra note 183.
196. As indicated above, only those tests that are, in the author's opinion, especially
adaptable to the public employment context are discussed in this section. As such, not all
the standard Establishment Clause test options are detailed herein.
197. See SMITH, supra note 5, at 118 (footnote omitted).
198. See, e.g., TEBBE, supra note 7, at 99.
199. Id. at 170-71.
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One way to reconcile this test into a more workable framework
for the public employment context would be to further define its
parameters.200 One scholar, Professor Gary Simson, has proposed
the following additional definition.201 First, a decision maker must
determine if the burden placed on religious exercise was by the
government or a private party.202 If a private party, the govern-
ment cannot take any further action to alleviate the burden with-
out "endorsing" religion.203 If a public employee is complaining that
they are unable to freely exercise their religion in their work con-
text, the situation will likely always be due to the government em-
ployer's policy, action, or regulation. As such, the first prong on this
test will most always be answered affirmatively, and thereby is
moot. Next, however, the test inquires into whether the burden on
religion is substantial or insubstantial.204 If insubstantial, and
there is a rational basis against providing the exemption, the gov-
ernment cannot provide the exemption without "endorsing" reli-
gion.205 If substantial, and denying the exemption is necessary to
serve a compelling state interest, the government cannot provide
the exemption without "endorsing" religion.206
The most obvious challenge with this test is the idea that a court
will sit in judgment on what is a "substantial" versus an "insub-
stantial" burden on religion. Such a determination seems to be di-
rectly at odds with the currently prevailing paradigm.207 In defend-
ing the propriety of a court inquiring into the substantiality of the
burden on religion, Professor Simson states that while courts
should defer to the religious claimant regarding whether the belief
itself qualifies as "religious," it should not defer regarding whether
200. See Simson, supra note 12, at 545.
201. Id. at 549-50.
202. Id. at 549.
203. Id. at 550.
204. Id. at 549-50. Professor Simson goes on to elaborate on what would qualify as sub-
stantial, using pre-Smith caselaw as a guide. Id. at 565-78. Professor Simson advocates
striking a balance between too much protection that would stymie the ability of government
to effectively regulate and too little protection that would disparately impact minority reli-
gions. Id. at 572. Even with thirty years of Supreme Court precedent to help strike this
balance, it is unclear what concrete standards and weighing measures could be used that
are not outcome determinative depending on which paradigm the decision maker sub-
scribes. See supra note 107 (discussing Justice Gorsuch's reference in Masterpiece to "ap-
ply[ing] a sort of Goldilocks rule").
205. Simson, supra note 12, at 551-52.
206. Id. at 551-53.
207. Supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
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the action or inaction required by the government is a "substantial"
burden to that belief.208
Professor Simson contends that only in "rare instances" is a
claimant forced to choose between complying with the government
requirement and suffering personal turmoil of violating one's own
religion, or complying with religious tenets and suffering adverse
consequences of violating the law, policy, or regulation.209 Profes-
sor Simson supports this argument by making the distinction be-
tween suffering adverse consequences as a result of having to vio-
late the law to comply with religion tenets, and suffering adverse
consequences as a result of simultaneously complying with reli-
gious tenets and the relevant law (thereby not violating the law).210
Taking Masterpiece as an example, he distinguishes between ques-
tioning whether the refusal to bake wedding cakes for same-sex
couples itself violated religious tenets, and questioning whether
complying with the law to adhere to this religious tenet caused a
substantial burden.21 1 Regarding the latter, the questioning in-
volves whether ceasing to bake wedding cakes at all-as the baker
could not bake only for opposite sex and not same-sex couples-is
a substantial burden.212 As Professor Simson points out, this can
be answered without reference to any element of religion.213 Ra-
ther, it is a matter of economic realities and disadvantage or cost
to a business, which could be deemed significant.214
208. Simson, supra note 12, at 573-74.
209. Id. at 574.
210. Professor Simson points to the religious claimants in Braunfeld v. Brown to help
illustrate this point. Id. (citing 366 U.S. 599 (1961)). The issue in that case was a law that
required businesses to close on Sundays. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 600. The claimants were
Orthodox Jewish merchants who could not work on Saturdays. Id. at 601. Professor Simson
argues that they were not faced with the "rare circumstance" choice referenced above be-
cause they could simply forgo the income from Saturday and Sunday by changing their life-
style choices, changing professions, or adapting their business model. Simson, supra note
12, at 574. All of these choices appear to be squarely in the situation of choosing to comply
with one's religion and suffering adverse consequences due to the law. However, as Profes-
sor Simson points out, it is not a "stark choice" between following the law or following one's
religious tenets. Id. Professor Simson argues it is because the answer to this question-of
how much burden is caused by following the law while still adhering to religious tenet-is
a sliding scale of burden analysis, that the inquiry does not have anything to do with reli-
gious examination. Id. at 574-75. And this analysis, he argues, is thus squarely within the
province of the courts. Id.
211. Simson, supra note 12, at 575-78.
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b. Adapted Free Speech Test
Another method could be to adopt the public-employee specific
test regarding the balance between the need for workplace regula-
tion and the constitutional right of free speech.215 Specifically, this
test would ask three questions: (1) is the religious exercise/objec-
tion pursuant to official duties, (2) is the religious exercise/objec-
tion on a matter of public concern, and (3) is the religious exer-
cise/objection disruptive to the workplace.216 If the answer to
question one is yes, then the religious exercise/objection is not pro-
tected and the employer is free to discipline the employee or reject
the accommodation request.2 17 The underlying support for this con-
clusion is that actions taken pursuant to official duties are that of
the government agency itself; they do not belong to the individual
employee.218 Thus, in answering this question, one would consider
where the religious activity, or refraining from conduct pursuant
to religious objection, takes place and whether it is "part and par-
cel" of an employee's work duties.219
If it is not pursuant to official duties, the next question is
whether the exercise/objection is "on a matter of public concern."2 20
If the answer is yes, the religious exercise/objection is protected
and the employer must accommodate it, subject to the final in-
quiry.221 If no, it is not protected.22 2 In determining whether a mat-
ter is of public concern in the speech context, a decision maker
could ask whether it relates to any matter of political, social, or
215. Corbin, supra note 38, at 1197-98. Professor Corbin specifically states that the goal
of her article is not to argue that the public employee speech doctrine should be wholesale
adopted in the public employment religious exercise context, but rather that it should be a
model for further discussion. Id. at 1256.
216. Id. at 1198, 1204-05.
217. Id. at 1198-1200, 1205.
218. Id. at 1199, 1209-10 (arguing that if the religious act or inaction impacts official
duties, it becomes state action or inaction that cannot be separated from the government or
attributable solely to the individual). But see TEBBE, supra note 7, at 175-77 (discussing
how it may be possible to accommodate both religious freedom concerns and antidiscrimi-
nation concerns by distinguishing between the officeholder, the individual, and the office
itself). Though Professor Corbin argues that acts that impact official duties become state
action, she does suggest that inaction of a public employee that is covered by another em-
ployee might be acceptable. Corbin, supra note 38, at 1210. In this way, it appears Professor
Corbin may agree with Professor Tebbe that such an accommodation respecting religious
liberties while balancing antidiscrimination concerns may be acceptable.
219. Corbin, supra note 38, at 1206.
220. Id. at 1206, 1215-16.




other concern in the community.223 A decision maker could also ask
whether it is "newsworthy," that is, whether it is a subject of gen-
eral interest and value to the public.224
Finally, even if the exercise/objection is on a matter of public
concern, the decision maker must inquire into whether the reli-
gious exercise/objection is unduly disruptive to the workplace; if it
is, then it does not need to be accommodated.225 During this in-
quiry, the decision maker would weigh the value of the religious
interest against the amount of disruptiveness to the work environ-
ment.2 26 This is especially important in the context of public em-
ployment where not only the government employer, but also the
public, has an interest in the efficient provision of public ser-
vices.227
There are a number of issues with this method.228 First, there
may not always be a clear distinction between acting pursuant to
official duties and acting as an individual, as there is in the free
speech context.229 This is because religious exercise is so clearly not
a government function that one could argue a reasonable observer
can distinguish between the employee's accommodated exercise
and official government action.230 However, the employee is still a
"representative" of the government during work hours to some ex-
tent, opening the government employer to claims of "endorsement"
for undisciplined conduct of its employees.23 1
223. Id. at 1200.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1201-02, 1222-30.
226. Id. at 1201. Examples of disruption include interference with supervision of employ-
ees, destruction of necessary working relationships, inability to perform job functions, and
serious disrepute brought upon the government agency. Id. at 1202.
227. Id. at 1222.
228. Professor Corbin acknowledges many of the issues, and responds. Id. at 1230-48.
Specifically, Professor Corbin states, in essence, that the paradigm through which one views
an issue will be one of the factors for determining which test one finds appropriate in the
public employee context. See id. at 1256 (stating that the preferred test will depend, among
other things, on "one's view of the distinctiveness of religion").
229. See supra note 218.
230. Id. Even so, Professor Tebbe warns that this distinction requires that other citizens
do not experience a tangible impact, which in his view would mean that the accommodation
is essentially invisible to the outside observer. TEBBE, supra note 7, at 176. For example, in
the case of issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, a county deputy clerk who is also
religious objector can be relieved from involvement so long as another clerk is available to
issue the licenses and such transferring of duties does not place an undue hardship on other
colleagues. Compare id. with discussion infra note 264.
231. See supra note 136.
2020] 983
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Second, whether religious exercise/objection is a matter of public
concern can often be answered by the paradigm through which the
decision maker is viewing the scenario. Decision makers who view
the world through the protection paradigm might see the public
exercise of personal religious convictions of each citizen as contrib-
uting to the tapestry of religious freedoms for all, and increasing
the diversity in the marketplace of ideas and viewpoints.232 Others
who view the world through the subordination paradigm might see
religious convictions as purely personal matters that must be set
aside when engaging in the public's business.233 This standard is
not alone in being subject to the whims of the prevailing paradigm.
Nevertheless, it makes the standard less ideal for providing con-
sistent and foreseeable resolutions that employers and employees
can anticipate and rely upon.
The final prong has much in common with the harm principle
test addressed in the following section, and therefore suffers from
the same challenges. Those challenges will be discussed in further
detail below, but essentially come down to the same issue as the
second prong of this test. Namely, it does not lend itself to con-
sistent future application on which employers and employees could
rely in navigating their working relationships and decisions.
c. Harm Principle
A much-discussed and popular method of discerning the balance
between freedom of religion and other antidiscrimination concerns
is the harm principle.234 This comes in many forms and standards
of measurement.235 For example, two standards of measurement
for harm that have been proposed are the materiality standard and
the undue hardship standard.236
232. See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 38, at 1218 & n.117 (citing a case that discusses reli-
gious convictions as a matter of social and community concern); Gedicks & Van Tassel, su-
pra note 34, at 323.
233. See Corbin, supra note 38, at 1218-19 & n.121.
234. See, e.g., TEBBE, supra note 7, at 51-52; Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 34, at
337-38; Simson, supra note 12, at 542 (arguing that harm is not "a matter of independent
importance" to a religious exemption analysis but can be indirectly taken into account in
the event that harm to a third party undermines the government's ability to achieve its
compelling interest objective).
235. Supra note 234.
236. TEBBE, supra note 7, at 61-62; Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 34, at 337-38.
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One iteration of the materiality standard, adapted from common
law torts principles, asks whether protecting the religious exercise
at issue would impart a cost of such significance that a private
party would factor it into how he or she might respond.237 Or, put
another way, whether the increase in cost to the third party is cog-
nizable, or so miniscule as to not warrant a response.238 If cogniza-
ble to such a degree as to elicit a response, accommodation would
not be appropriate.239
The undue hardship standard, adapted from employment law,
asks whether the protection of the religious exercise at issue would
impose more than a de minimis burden on others.240 If so, accom-
modation is inappropriate.24 1 Under either of these standards, the
question is essentially one of degree.
The challenge with allowing the idea of "harm to another" to rule
the outcome of these issues is that practically anything can be
deemed "harm" and thus justify governmental regulation in a dis-
turbingly wide breadth of contexts.242 As Professor Steven D.
Smith states in his book, The Rise and Decline of American Reli-
gious Freedom, it is "wildly implausible" to conclude that any "re-
ligious faiths and practices inflict no 'harm' on others."243 Religious
beliefs and practices take a normative stance on persons and be-
haviors in society that many find unpalatable and offensive.244
Therefore, whether decisions rooted in protected religious liberties
cause "harm to others is rarely, if ever, a distinguishing feature,"
which would obviate its usefulness as a weighing measure.245 In-
deed, Professor Nelson Tebbe, though advocating for the undue
237. TEBBE, supra note 7, at 61.
238. See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 34, at 337-38.
239. TEBBE, supra note 7, at 61.
240. Id. at 62-63.
241. Id. at 63.
242. SMITH, supra note 5, at 43-44 (stating, not unlike proponents of the harm principle,
that harm could include "not only bodily injury and economic loss but also psychic injury-
including feelings of subordination or alienation or indignation").
243. Id. at 44.
244. See id. at 44 & nn.152-54.
245. Simson, supra note 12, at 542. Professor Simson argues,
The important question for constitutional purposes is not whether an exemp-
tion causes harm to others or whether the harm to others takes more specific
or general form. Instead, it is the extent to which such harm detracts from the
government's ability to effectuate the law's objective(s), and that question is
properly answered without giving special weight to . .. harm to others.
Id.
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hardship standard, recognizes that the standard "seems harsh be-
cause it appears to require courts to deny all but the most innocu-
ous claims by religious actors."2 46
Furthermore, whether harm to a third party is substantial or de
minimis can depend entirely on the prevailing paradigm, or the
paradigm of the particular decision maker.247 In this way, the harm
principle as a stand-alone test suffers from the same challenges as
the second and third prong of the Free Exercise test. That is, it does
not allow for consistent and reliable precedent upon which employ-
ers and employees can rely in defining the proper scope of their
employment relationship, including religious accommodations.
d. The Combination Test
A final option for a workable standard in the public employment
context weighs four factors: (1) the magnitude of the third-party
harm, (2) the likelihood of the third-party harm, (3) the religious
interest at stake, and (4) exemptions made for nonreligious rea-
sons.248 The second factor would require the decision maker to con-
sider whether the harm is likely to occur and spread out enough
that while the aggregate cost may be troubling, the cost to any one
individual is not.2 49
The third component to this four-factor test inquires into the se-
riousness of the religious interest at issue.250 This third prong is
problematic in light of the Court's reaffirming that judgments on
the seriousness, justifiability, or centrality of a claimed religious
interest are an inappropriate inquiry.251 However, if the third com-
ponent to this four-factor test was modified to include instead an
246. TEBBE, supra note 7, at 64. Professor Tebbe goes on to say, however, that courts
have mostly applied the standard in sensible ways. Id. This conclusion may also be a ques-
tion of which paradigm or "baseline for comparison" with which one is viewing the issue. Id.
at 59-60.
247. See, e.g., Gedicks & Van Tassel, supra note 34, at 331, 340 (stating that the Court
in Hobby Lobby, in a footnote, departed from set third-party harm principles in favor of an
analysis that is "insignificant and implausible" and was a "casual dismissal of third-party
burdens"); id. at 340 ("As with all line-drawing rules, materiality can present difficult issues
at the margin-how to distinguish between a slight (immaterial) third-party burden and a
heavier (material) one."); Barclay, supra note 45, at 348 (stating that "there is no such con-
sensus" on what constitutes harm, "only a plurality of views of what harm is").
248. Lund, supra note 33, at 1377-81.
249. Id. at 1378.
250. Id. at 1379.
251. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
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inquiry into whether the burden on religion was substantial or in-
substantial, as articulated in the modified "no endorsement" test,
discussed supra section IV.B.3.a, this component could be useful
and neutrally administered.
Finally, the fourth inquiry focuses on what secular exemptions
to the government action, policy, law, or regulation at issue exist.25 2
The more exemptions there are for nonreligious reasons, the more
understandable and justifiable a religious exemption becomes and
the more it is protected from an Establishment Clause challenge.253
The challenge with the first component, harm to others, is laid
out prior and will not be readdressed here. Suffice it to say that the
most difficult component of this standard will be the unpredicta-
bility of a decision maker's determination of what constitutes suf-
ficient "harm" to overcome the religious freedom at stake. This may
not provide direction if it simply results in the majority paradigm
being able to control the outcome due to its baseline frame of ref-
erence. Nevertheless, balancing harm with the likelihood of harm
both in the aggregate and individually is helpful in this regard.
Also, the fact that this test takes into account not just harm, but
balances it with other factors as well, aids with the workability of
this standard.25 4
Additionally, as Professor Christopher C. Lund argues, balanc-
ing the religious interest at issue may be inevitable in order to
come up with a workable harm standard.25 5 Even so, it does still
lend itself to the cyclical nature of the prevailing paradigm
norms.256 A way to temper this is to keep in mind that the balanc-
ing of these interests requires an underlying consideration about
the justification itself for burdening religious liberties.25 7
That is, the Establishment Clause itself sets up a system that
essentially already disadvantages protecting religious freedoms.25 8
Government is allowed to apportion burdens all the time, except
252. Lund, supra note 33, at 1381.
253. Id.
254. See Barclay, supra note 45, at 349-50 (arguing that harm is "a necessary but not
sufficient condition" and that it should be taken into account along with other factors such
as the net gain for society and mitigation alternatives).
255. Lund, supra note 33, at 1381.
256. See supra notes 5-21 and accompanying text.
257. Lund, supra note 33, at 1382-83.
258. Id.
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when the burden is caused by the exercise of religious freedom.25 9
Thus, as Professor Lund states, the Establishment Clause allows
the government to care about any secular interest to any degree
and impose any kind of third-party harm in pursuit of that secular
interest, but it "cannot . . . care about free exercise in the same
way."260 Because the system relegates religious liberties to such a
disadvantage before the balancing even begins, such "powerfully
distinctive treatment should require an equally powerful set of jus-
tifications."26 1 That is, when weighing these factors, the decision
maker should immediately be looking for strong justification that
would prohibit free exercise accommodation, for only a strong jus-
tification should be allowed to counterbalance a liberty already at
a disadvantage.26 2 And, at least in the prevailing paradigm, digni-
tary harm would not be enough to overcome an interest in protect-
ing religious liberties.26 3
4. The Case for a Modified Combination Test: An Illustration
As between all the tests described, the combination test dis-
cussed previously with a modification discussed here, would be the
most workable in the public employment context. This test would
require an employer, an employee assessing a claim, or an after-
the-fact decision maker to weigh (1) the magnitude of the third-
party harm, (2) the likelihood of the third-party harm, (3) the sub-
stantiality of the burden on the person requesting religious accom-
modation if such were not granted, and (4) exemptions made for
nonreligious reasons. The modification from the original combina-
tion test would substitute the third "seriousness of the religious
freedom asserted" inquiry, an inquiry that is diametrically opposed
to current Court jurisprudence and subject to the whims of the pre-
vailing paradigm, with an inquiry into whether complying with the
259. Id. at 1382.
260. Id. at 1383.
261. Id. Professor Lund argues, "It is tempting to say that constitutional rights are fine
as long as they impose no harm on others. It is tempting, but it cannot survive scrutiny.
Constitutional rights always involve some degree of harm to others. And our willingness to
tolerate that harm depends heavily on context." Id. at 1384.
262. See id. at 1382-83.
263. See Barclay, supra note 91 (stating that Masterpiece indicates a commitment to not
allowing feelings of hurt, embarrassment, or insult to overcome First Amendment rights
including free exercise of religion). As Professor Barclay points out, a rule allowing dignitary
harm to trump First Amendment religious liberties "would allow the government to stamp
out just about any religious belief that is politically unpopular." Id.
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government requirement in a way that still adheres to religious
tenets results in a substantial burden. This modification is taken
from the endorsement est modification discussed supra section
IV.B.3.a.
Public employers and employees can use this test when deter-
mining whether a religious exercise in furtherance of a sincerely
held religious belief can, or should, result in a departure from a
policy or practice, or require some other form of accommodation,
without violating the Establishment Clause. As an illustration,
this Article examines the test below in the context of a Catholic
police officer who has a religious objection to abortion. When she is
assigned the patrol of a planned anti-abortion rally at a local clinic,
which may require ensuring that patients can get to the clinic un-
hindered, she refuses on the basis that she cannot facilitate abor-
tions.
The first prong of the test would require a determination of the.
magnitude of third-party harm. This will require an extensive fac-
tual inquiry. For example, is there another officer available to take
that patrol who does not have the same objections? If there is, does
switching the patrols cause a burden on the other officer in terms
of time on duty, desirability of assignments, or otherwise? Is the
available officer "same in kind" as the replaced officer (i.e., same
years of experience, same rank, etc.)? At issue in these questions,
essentially, is an inquiry into whether the religious accommoda-
tion would cause a loss of services.264 If so, the magnitude of harm
would be significant. Also at issue is a question asked in the Free
Speech Test context: whether the religious accommodation would
significantly disrupt the workplace. Thus, this prong effectively
merges employment-specific and public-services-specific elements.
264. See TEBBE, supra note 7, at 168. Professor Tebbe also argues that considerations
should go beyond actual loss of services to whether those affected will suffer "dignitary
harm" regardless of whether they obtain the services at issue. Id. at 169. Take for example,
the situation where a city clerk refuses to issue marriage license to same sex couples, so as
an accommodation this clerk does not have to issue them because other clerks will. Id. Dig-
nitary harm could arise if a same-sex couple is delayed in getting their license if the reason
for the delay, finding a willing clerk, is obvious. Id. Additionally, in this same example, even
if the same-sex couple is not delayed, they might still be "impermissibly differentiated by
an official's refusal" thereby indicating dignitary harm regardless of whether the couple is
aware of the harm. Id. Professor Tebbe, perhaps anticipating a de minimis harms argument,
asserts that this dignitary harm rises above the level of "hurt feelings" because it "effects a
change in the legal relationship between government and members of the political commu-
nity." Id.
2020] 989
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
The second prong inquires into the likelihood of the harm, both
individually and in the aggregate. In this example, if the accommo-
dation would result in loss of services, say if no officer was availa-
ble to take the patrol, the harm caused when there is loss of ser-
vices might not only be to the party affected (the clinic and its
patients), but could undermine public confidence in the neutrality
of government itself.265 This could be detrimental in certain con-
texts, including police and protection services.266 Thus, a consider-
ation of the harm not only of the individuals affected, but to society
as a whole if applicable, is particularly germane in the public em-
ployment context.
The next prong is an inquiry into whether complying with the
government requirement while still adhering to religious tenets
would result in a substantial burden. In this case, should the of-
ficer not be accommodated, she could choose to forgo the assign-
ment, thus adhering to religious tenets, and suffer the conse-
quences of that decision. This could include discipline, up to and
including termination, or other adverse employment actions. Loss
of the ability to earn a living due to religious exercise is a high
burden.26 7 However, discipline short of termination may not be
substantial or substantial enough in light of the third-party harms.
The final inquiry is what secular accommodations exist. For ex-
ample, if it is not unusual for patrols to be traded to accommodate
medical needs, parenting needs, or other needs, the police depart-
ment would have much less support for refusing an accommoda-
tion, and an accommodation would be less likely to trigger Estab-
lishment Clause concerns.268
265. See Corbin, supra note 38, at 1227-28.
266. Id.; see also, e.g., David Kadney & Amy Royce, Face It, We've Lost the Public's Trust,
CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-miscon
duct-police-prosecutors-justice-trust-perspec-1204-20151203-story.html (detailing suspi-
cious police uses of force, shootings, hiding of evidence, and other indicia of disparate treat-
ment that results in a loss of the public's trust) [https://perma.cc/YPF6-GK2D]. However,
Professor Corbin also notes that not all government services and agencies are created equal
on this score. Corbin, supra note 38, at 1228. Losing public trust in police services is not the
same as losing public trust for a government office that does not rely on the public's cooper-
ation to function. Id. at 1228-29.
267. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963) (holding that having to choose be-
tween abiding by one's religious beliefs and accepting work "puts the same kind of burden
upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against" an employee for his or
her worship).
268. This inquiry is in line with the Court's emphasis in Hobby Lobby regarding accom-
modations made to other bakers on secular grounds, but not the baker refusing to make a
wedding cake for a same-sex wedding celebration.
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In the case where a loss of services would result, the discipline
of the objecting officer was loss in pay for the day in question, and
accommodations for shift assignment transfers were only spar-
ingly granted in other contexts, it is unlikely that the balance
would be in favor of the religious freedom interest at issue and an
accommodation would be an inappropriate establishment of reli-
gion due to clear preference being shown to the religious interest
at issue. However, where no loss of services would result, and the
damage of not accommodating would be the employee's termina-
tion, even where secular accommodations were sparse, and cer-
tainly if they were prevalent, the weight of the balance would be in
favor of allowing accommodation as such justifiably does not prefer
religion over other religions or nonreligion. As the previous discus-
sion illustrates, although the balancing is entirely fact dependent,
it provides a workable framework within which to analyze a par-
ticular situation while still allowing some room for value judg-
ments. Because it takes into account a number of factors, however,
the test has a more predictable nature than a pure "harm" test.
Due to the workability of this standard in the public employment
context in balancing Free Exercise Clause and Establishment
Clause interests, which often will be the balance between religious
liberties and other antidiscrimination interests, decision makers
would be well-served to adopt it as a sufficient measure for future
decisions.
CONCLUSION
The balance between religious freedom and antidiscrimination
interests has recently moved towards greater protection for reli-
gious liberties. This protection paradigm appears to have a foot-
hold in the Court that is unlikely to change in the near future. This
development, along with the Court's recent pronouncement hat
situation-specific tests should be utilized for Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, signals the need for a context-specific test for re-
quests for religious accommodations in the public employment con-
text. A test that balances the magnitude and likelihood of third-
party harm, substantiality of burden to the religious objector if not
accommodated, and availability or prevalence of secular accommo-
dations provides a workable standard. This test allows for factual
inquiry and context-specific value judgments, while still providing
a workable framework and sufficiently predictable results. As
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such, it provides a useful tool for public employers, public employ-
ees, and courts alike to determine the appropriate balance between
religious liberties and antidiscrimination interests in the public
employment context post-Masterpiece Cake and American Legion.
